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What do we know about the effects of structural reforms? One main reason the answer 
may be “little” is inadequate measurement. In this paper we put forward improved 
measures of economic liberalization across countries over time. We show that structural 
reforms, carefully measured, follow richer dynamics (than those from existing indexes) 
which are very closely linked to the theoretical work. For example, we find FDI inflows 
reduce the likelihood of privatization reversals and labour strikes increase that of price 
liberalization reversals. We also find that our new measures, in standard specifications, 
have larger and more precisely estimated impacts on growth.  
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Nontechnical Summary 
In this paper we aim to contribute to the growing literature on the political economy of 
reform. The economic transition in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is 
arguably the largest natural experiment on economic reform in recent history and it is 
paradoxical to say the least that efforts to systematically measure such reform efforts have 
not emerged. In consequence, there have been very few efforts to take the many 
theoretical insights to the data. This is in part because reform is a political economy topic 
par excellence: reform is multidimensional and it is driven by the complex interplay of 
political and economic forces. 
This paper tries to address this gap in the literature by constructing “objective” measures 
for three main reform areas in all transition economies for all years from 1989 to 2001. 
Compared to the existing (subjective) indexes, our new measures not only generate a less 
optimistic assessment of the reform process, but also depict this process as being much 
less smooth than previously thought (more specifically, according to our measures reform 
reversals abound, while that is not the case with the subjective measures). We also believe 
this is one of the first papers to try to implement empirically the distinction between 
reform effort inputs and outcomes. This distinction is important because the inclusion of 
outcome indicators can severely bias the resulting measures.  
Our results suggest that domestic growth is a determinant for external liberalization and 
privatization, concentration of political power matters for internal liberalization, and 
democracy is important for all three of them. We also find that FDI inflows reduce the 
likelihood of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization 
reversals, and OECD growth increases that of external liberalization reversals. Finally, we 
replicate the results from the main econometric studies of the effects of reform on growth 
and find that those effects, using our objective measures of reform, are larger, more 
precisely estimated and more robust. 
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Since the early 1990s, a number of structural reforms have been implemented throughout 
the world, with varying degrees of success. A large literature has developed, although 
according to two authoritative surveys (Drazen, 2000, and Persson and Tabellini, 2000) 
commensurate empirical evidence has yet to materialize: “the gap between theory and 
evidence is a final weakness of the existing literature” (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p. 
481).
1 One would expect that evidence from developing and transition countries (i.e. from 
those that have implemented large-scale economic reforms) would provide such empirical 
evidence at once, but that has not happened either. 
The theoretical political economy literature on structural reforms started out by 
addressing issues such as why socially beneficial reforms are not implemented, and 
evolved towards normative questions such as how reforms can be designed so that they 
overcome political resistance so as to end up not being reversed.
2 Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) place status quo bias at the centre of these problems: individual-specific 
uncertainty over the outcome of a reform (more precisely, who will be the winners and 
losers) leads a majority of voters to expect to lose from reform ex ante, even though they 
all know that a majority gain from reform ex post. If reform is implemented, the losers 
will be a minority so they will not have the political power to reverse the reform, while 
the winners cannot credibly promise to compensate the losers. Alesina and Drazen (1991) 
look at this issue in terms of implementation delays in a war of attrition model. This 
generates an important hypothesis (for which we find some empirical support) regarding 
political fractionalization. Governments will not need to negotiate how to allocate the 
short-term cost of reforms if they have a stable majority in parliament. Dewatripont and 
Roland (1992, 1995) provide various influential models of reform dynamics inspired by 
the transition from communism. They stress the role of uncertainty about the outcome of 
reforms in terms of the government choice of implementation sequence. Contrasting big-
bang to gradualist strategies, they argue the latter is easier to implement because it 
involves learning and experimentation.
3 Although the theoretical arguments for 
sequencing seem to have been somehow vindicated by the emergence of the so-called 
second-generation reforms, a number of authors have spelled out the case for a big-bang 
strategy. The main arguments for the latter include the costs of partial reforms, time-
consistency issues and the advantages of a political honeymoon in which credibility 
provides an opportunity to implement painful measures.
4 One central element in the 
                                                           
1 Or more specifically, “There are a number of theoretical models that stress the role of reform 
strategies. Yet the data for discriminating among these models is lacking. The few indicators available 
are unnecessarily subjective” (Campos and Coricelli, 2002, p. 831).  
2 For surveys of the literature, see Asilis and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Rodrik (1996), Bhattacharya 
(1997), Drazen (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Kuczynski and Williamson (2003).  
3 On the role of learning in reform dynamics see also Goodhue, Rausser and Simon (1998) and 
Schroder (2001). Appropriately sequenced reforms also create constituencies for further reforms. 
Collier and Gunning (1999) argue that a main reason for the poor performance of IMF-supported 
structural adjustment programmes is inattention to sequencing.  
4 Martinelli and Tommasi (1997) argue that even when gradualism is the unconstrained choice of the 
social planner, time-consistency considerations may force simultaneous implementation of all reforms. 4   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
Dewatripont-Roland models is the role of reform reversals: reformers try to design reform 
packages that incorporate costs of reversal that are high enough to deter political 
resistance (see also Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). There are also important models 
arguing that crises trigger economic reforms (see Drazen and Grilli, 1993). The argument 
is that the political impediments to reform may be so large that reform will not be 
implemented unless a crisis occurs because a larger share of the population benefits from 
it in the aftermath (Drazen and Easterly, 2001).  
What do we actually know about the determinants and effects of structural reforms? 
Unfortunately, the answer is little and this is because there have been too few efforts 
empirically testing the main theoretical propositions from the political economy literature. 
One important reason is that structural reforms are difficult to measure consistently across 
countries and over time. Moreover, some reforms (e.g. privatization) have elements of 
both “stroke of the pen national policies” (Easterly, 2006) and harder-to-change 
“institutions” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2006). Another important reason is the 
paucity of comprehensive reform measures. There are a number of studies that focus on 
one reform and/or on one country but few that dealt with multiple reforms in more than 
one country over time.5 A third, final reason is that the results using the existing measures 
of reform are far from conclusive. Babetskii and Campos (2007) collect data from 43 
econometric studies and show that the t-values of the more than 300 coefficients (on the 
impact of reforms on growth in transition economies) follow a normal distribution with 
mean zero: a third of them are positive and significant, another third are negative and 
significant, and the remaining third are not statistically significant. They try explaining 
this variation in terms of differences in econometric method, in specification and in the 
measurement of reform. Bearing in mind that all 43 papers use data from exactly the same 
sources (more on this in section 2 below), subject to small variations such as levels, 
changes, stocks and lags, they find that about two-thirds of the explained variance is 
accounted for by measurement.  
The period after the collapse of communism generated what is arguably the largest natural 
experiment in economic reform in recent history and it is paradoxical that more 
satisfactory indicators of reform are still unavailable. This paper tries to close this gap. 
The objective of this paper is two-fold. One is to construct “objective” (more on this 
below) measures of privatization and external and internal liberalization reform efforts for 
25 Eastern European and former Soviet Union economies between 1989 and 2001. The 
second is to use these new measures to shed light on various hypotheses from the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
In their model, the time-inconsistency of the “optimal reform sequences” arises because winners from 
early reforms will oppose any later reforms that may hurt them. Knowing that, losers from early 
reforms will oppose the earlier measures and require additional compensation. See also Lipton and 
Sachs (1990) and Murphy et al. (1992). 
5 The measurement of economic reforms was pioneered by Lora (1997, 2001), who studied five 
reforms: trade, tax, financial, privatization and labour market regulation. These are aggregated in a 
structural policy index for 20 Latin American countries yearly from 1985 to 1995. In addition, two 
reform areas that have received a great deal of attention across countries and over time are financial 
liberalization and privatization. On privatization, Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an extensive 
review of the evidence, while on financial liberalization, important recent contributions are those by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Abiad and Mody (2005).         Reform Redux: 




theoretical literature on the political economy of reform that have not been explored 
before (notably the case of reform reversals). 
Our main findings are as follows. Compared to existing measures, ours generate a less 
optimistic assessment of the reform process, depicting it as being much less smooth than 
previously thought (in other words, we find a much larger number of instances of reform 
reversals). We find that political reform (democratization) is the main determinant of 
reform (in the sense that it matters irrespective of the type or area of reform). We find a 
few important reform-specific determinants: economic growth for external liberalization 
and privatization, and concentration of political power for internal liberalization. We also 
find that inflows of foreign direct investment reduce the probability of privatization 
reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal liberalization reversals, and negative 
terms of trade shocks increase that of external liberalization reversals. Finally, we 
replicate various econometric studies on the effects of reform on growth and find that 
those effects, using our objective measures of reform, are larger and more precisely 
estimated. 
We should note at the outset that we leave one major topic for future research. Two 
central issues in the political economy of reform literature are reversals and sequencing. 
We have dealt extensively with the former in this paper, but have strong reasons to leave 
the latter for future efforts. This is despite our results being somewhat clear in this 
respect: in our sample, the set of countries seems to have implemented reform by 
advancing first internal liberalization, then external liberalization and finally privatization. 
This sequence is observed even in the countries that have gone the furthest in privatizing 
and opening up their economies. Because we have focused on only three reform areas, the 
number of potential sequences of reform is limited. We are convinced that disaggregating 
our three indexes is vital for a deeper examination of sequencing issues. For instance, 
from the raw data we can identify that wage liberalization was preceded by price 
liberalization in most countries (these are two components of our internal liberalization 
index).  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the existing 
measures of reform. Section 3 presents our new objective reform indicators and 
benchmarks them against the subjective indicators used in most of the literature. Section 4 
compares the performance of our indicators with that of the existing indicators in terms of 
the determinants of reform and in terms of growth implications. Section 5 concludes and 
presents some suggestions for future research. 
2. The Rationale for Improved Reform Measures  
International organizations are the main source of indicators of reform for our sample of 
countries, as such indexes have been constructed by the World Bank and the EBRD. The 
World Bank started this work in the early 1990s by putting forward three reform 
indicators, covering privatization and internal and external liberalization efforts. Later on, 
the EBRD took over this task and improved upon the early set by offering many more 
(nine) indicators, covering finer, more detailed aspects of reform. The two sets of indexes 6   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
are constructed in a similar manner, namely in three steps: (1) a comprehensive set of 
underlying objective variables is collected, (2) a common scale and weighting scheme is 
agreed upon, and (3) country and sector specialists study these data, judge them and agree 
on individual scores on each reform item for each country in each year (the top score is 
set to reflect the standards and performance typical of those in advanced industrial 
countries).  
One main advantage of this approach is the ability to “quality-weight” the data. Consider, 
for instance, a government that chooses to manipulate the data because it believes that if 
more favourable figures are presented this would increase the likelihood of receiving a 
loan from an international organization or improve the terms of that loan. Subjective 
indexes can to some extent discount, or give a lower weight to, such information. Another 
main advantage is that these indexes are available in a balanced panel format for all years 
since 1991. 
The data effort carried out at the World Bank is presented in the World Development 
Report 1996 (further details are in de Melo et al., 1997). The overall liberalization index 
is a weighted average of three areas: (1) internal markets (liberalization of domestic prices 
and the abolition of state trading monopolies), (2) external markets (liberalization of the 
foreign trade regime, including elimination of export controls and taxes, and substitution 
of low-to-moderate import duties for import quotas and current account convertibility), 
and (3) private sector entry (privatization of small-scale and large-scale enterprises and 
banking reform). The weights for this overall liberalization index are determined a priori 
and set as follows: 0.3 for internal liberalization, 0.3 for external liberalization and 0.4 for 
privatization.  
The EBRD (2004) reform indicators are more numerous and cover large-scale 
privatization, small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price 
liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and 
interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and 
infrastructure reform. For this paper, the EBRD indexes on price and external 
liberalization and privatization are of particular interest. Regarding price liberalization, 
they survey national authorities and use IMF country reports to determine the share of 
administered (regulated) prices in the Consumer Price Index as well as the share of goods 
with administered prices in a standardized “EBRD-15 basket”.
6 The EBRD also provides 
information on whether or not wages are regulated. Concerning external liberalization, the 
EBRD reports on the share of trade in GDP, the share of trade with non-transition 
economies and tariff revenues (as a percentage of imports; it includes all revenues from 
international trade, and imports are those of merchandise trade). With respect to 
privatization, the EBRD surveys national authorities for data on, inter alia, the share of 
privatized enterprises and the estimated share of private sector output and employment to 
GDP and total employment, respectively. The EBRD then creates aggregate indexes, one 
for price liberalization, one for foreign exchange and trade liberalization, and one for 
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small- and large-scale privatization.
7 These take values from “1” to “4+”. For example, 
regarding price liberalization, higher values of the index are associated with a smaller 
extent of price regulation. Thus, a score of 1 is obtained when most prices are controlled 
by the government. A score of 2 stands for some lifting of price administration, yet the 
state still sets the majority of prices. A score of 3 is reserved for significant progress in 
price liberalization, but still some involvement of the state in price regulation. A score of 
4 stands for comprehensive price liberalization, with only a small number of administered 
prices remaining. A score of 4+ means that standards and performance are typical to those 
of advanced industrial countries with no price control outside housing, transport and 
natural monopolies. 
 What are the main problems with these efforts? We identify five potential problems: (1) 
lack of information regarding which variables make up each index; (2) lack of 
information regarding how the underlying variables are combined into the aggregate 
indexes; (3) the fact that in the lists of potential underlying variables presented in the 
above-mentioned reports one finds policy inputs as well as policy outcomes; (4) the fact 
that the indexes change without attendant changes in the underlying data; and (5) the fact 
that these indexes’ maximum scores refer to an ill-defined reference point such as a 
“well-functioning market economy” or an “advanced industrial economy”. 
Let us now expand on each of these potential problems. One first problem we identify is 
the difficulty of knowing the exact variables underlying each reform indicator. More 
precisely, accompanying each index one finds a (sometimes large) number of related 
variables. Yet, statements indicating exactly which one of these variables is used in 
computing each reform index are not provided. 
A second potential problem is that it is very difficult to know exactly how the reform 
scores are generated. In other words, we were not able to find a description of how the set 
of underlying variables is translated into the overall scores. Notice that in the World Bank 
case, we know how each individual reform indicator is weighted in an overall reform 
index. But this is not what we have in mind here. In this case, we know how the aggregate 
reform index is constructed (that is, we know which variables are taken into account and 
what weights are attached to each of them), but we do not know how each of the three 
individual components are constructed (that is, an exact list of underlying variables and 
set of weights are not provided). The same holds with respect to the EBRD indexes.
8  
Third, and in our view the most important issue, is that in the list of underlying variables 
provided, one finds policy inputs as well as outcomes. For example, in the list of potential 
underlying variables often presented for external liberalization, one can find tariff levels 
as well as trade openness. As noted, Rodrik (2005) argues that we learn little from cross-
                                                           
7 Note that the price liberalization index was revised in 2003. The revision stressed the distinction 
between state price controls and utility price regulation. The improved index focuses solely on state 
price controls (see EBRD Transition Report, 2003, p. 18).  
8 For instance, “The transition indicators scores in Chapter 1 reflect the judgment of the EBRD’s Office 
of the Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition” (EBRD, 2004, p. 119, italics 
added). 8   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
country regressions of growth on reform because, inter alia, the literature does not isolate 
effort from outcomes when measuring reform. Loayza and Soto (2004) and Glaeser et al. 
(2004) also make this important point. 
Fourth, there are many instances where the overall reform score has been revised despite 
the fact that the “underlying data” remained unchanged, which suggests that the algorithm 
may well have changed.
9 This is rather surprising. It is well-known that statistical offices 
in the former communist countries were excellent in measuring output and employment 
(in physical terms), but were unprepared to deal with, say, inflation and unemployment 
(Bartholdy, 1997). One would expect the underlying data to be revised first, not the 
indexes. 
Fifth and finally, existing reform indicators are not continuous and are also benchmarked 
against an imprecisely defined reference point. They are categorical variables taking 
values from 1 to 4+, the latter reflecting the level of liberalization achieved in an 
“advanced industrial economy”. In an important paper, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) 
show that “advanced industrial economies” are highly heterogeneous with respect to the 
implementation of economic reforms, which diminishes the usefulness of this comparator.  
3. Improving the Measurement of Structural Reforms  
The objective of this section is to present the indexes of structural reform we construct for 
25 former communist economies between 1989 and 2001. We focus on three areas of 
reform. The first is internal liberalization reform efforts, by which we mean the extent of 
price and wage liberalization. The second area we focus on is external liberalization 
reform efforts, in particular the severity of trade barriers and capital controls. The third 
captures privatization reform efforts. How are these new reform measures constructed? 
Firstly, we compile an extensive set of underlying variables. Secondly, we evaluate 
various ways to normalize and aggregate these data, inter alia, simple averages, principal 
components and the one proposed by Lora (1997) and decide for the last mentioned on 
the basis of it being the simplest and most transparent as well as the one approach that has 
been used in the reform literature (see also Loayza et al., 2005). Thirdly, we classify these 
underlying objective indicators into “input” and “outcome” indicators of reform in order 
to generate input-only measures. Fourthly, and finally, we subject our indexes to various 
robustness tests by (a) excluding outcome indicators (or conversely, by examining our 
preferred input-only measures of reform),
10 (b) assessing reform dynamics across 
countries for various sub-periods and (c) comparing our objective indexes with those 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and World Bank. 
                                                           
9 Another possibility is that learning occurred. There are many examples of such changes, but arguably 
none less pronounced than the revisions one can observe in the scores for the Baltic countries in 
subsequent versions of the World Bank papers and of the EBRD’s Transition Reports. 
10 This is very important because it is one way of addressing the Rodrik critique (2005), according to 
which we learn little from regressions of growth on policies because existing measures seldom isolate 
effort from reform outcomes. If outcomes receive a high weight in the index (this is likely if they are 
subjective), then regressing indexes heavily weighted towards outcomes on outcomes themselves 
clearly should not be very informative.         Reform Redux: 




In constructing these indexes, we try to address each of the major drawbacks we identify 
in the existing measures. More specifically (and referring to the individual potential 
problems discussed in the previous section), the goal is to be as transparent and explicit as 
possible regarding (1) what are the underlying variables that make up each of our three 
reform indexes, (2) how the underlying variables are combined into each of the reform 
indexes, (3) how we separate out reform effort inputs from reform outcomes, (4) how our 
indexes change over time, relating these changes to changes in the underlying variables, 
and (5) how we use the in-sample maximum value of each index as a reference point (as 
opposed to an ideal “well-functioning market economy”). 
We set out to construct indexes of structural reform for 25 countries for all years between 
1989 and 2001.
11 This time window covers the period immediately following the collapse 
of communism as well as the late transition period (that is, the years following the 
Russian crisis of August 1998).  
What are the underlying variables that make up each of our three reform indexes? 
Altogether, we collect data on 44 underlying variables. These underlying variables for 
each of our three reform indexes are listed in Table 1 (which also shows how we choose 
to separate reform inputs from outcomes; more on this below).
12  
Regarding internal liberalization, we collected data for the following indicators: the 
number of goods subject to price regulation in the 15-good EBRD basket, the share of 
administered prices in the consumer price index (CPI) and wage regulation. The latter is a 
dummy variable reported in the EBRD Transition Report and is admittedly a very rough 
measure of labour market liberalization. The other two underlying variables also originate 
from the EBRD Transition Report, although we have contacted all the 25 national 
statistical offices and Ministries of Finance (and/or Economy) for assistance in double-
checking and filling any remaining data gaps. Out of our three reform indexes, the 
internal liberalization measure is clearly the closest to the existing indexes (except that it 
also includes wage regulation). As discussed below in more detail, despite this 
resemblance when we examine the correlation coefficients between ours and the existing 
reform measures, those for internal liberalization turn out surprisingly to be lower than 
those for external liberalization and privatization. 
Regarding external liberalization, the variables underlying our index are more numerous 
and contain 29 measures of capital controls and trade barriers. Capital controls indicators 
are as follows: controls on commercial credit, controls on foreign direct investment, 
controls on the liquidation of foreign direct investment, documentation requirements for 
the release of foreign exchange for imports, exchange rate taxes, interest rate 
liberalization, investment liberalization, multiple exchange rates, permission requirements 
                                                           
11 These are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Serbia and Montenegro were excluded for lack of data. We believe it would be worthwhile to update 
the indexes to address the further sensitivity checks on the usefulness of these indexes.  
12 A detailed appendix with information on the definition, coding and source for each of these variables 
is available at the end of the Appendix.  10   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
for foreign exchange accounts held abroad by residents, permission requirements for 
foreign exchange accounts held domestically by residents, permission requirements for 
foreign exchange accounts for non-residents, repatriation requirements, repatriation 
requirements for invisible transactions, surrender requirements and surrender 
requirements for invisible transactions. Data on trade barriers include the following: 
compatibility with Article VIII (current account convertibility), export duties as a 
percentage of tax revenues, export licences, export taxes, import duties as a percentage of 
tax revenue, import licences and quotas, import tariff rate, OECD and WTO membership, 
trade openness, share of trade with non-transition countries, tariff code lines, tariff 
revenues as a percentage of imports, and tax revenues on international trade (as a 
percentage of revenue). 
The underlying variables for external liberalization come from various sources. One main 
source of data is the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (Bodenstein, Plumper and Schneider, 2003). Additional data sources are the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, UNCTAD’s Handbook of Trade Statistics, 
EBRD’s Transition Reports, Penn World Tables 6.1 and the IMF, OECD and WTO 
websites. We have again contacted all 25 national statistical offices and Ministries of 
Finance (and/or Economy) for assistance in filling data gaps. 
Lastly, the privatization index is based upon the following variables: privatization 
revenues as a percentage of GDP, the share of small firms privatized, the ratio of assets of 
private-owned banks to assets of all banks, total number of enterprises privatized, total 
cumulative number of private enterprises, total number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises privatized, total number of large enterprises privatized,
13 share of foreign-
owned banks over total number of banks, private sector share in GDP, credit to private 
sector, private sector share of employment and private sector investment. The sources of 
the underlying variables for our privatization measure come from various sources: IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics, WB’s ECSPF database, EBRD’s Transition Reports, 
and EBRD survey to Central Banks and national authorities. We have also in this case 
contacted all 25 national statistical offices and Ministries of Finance (and/or Economy) 
for assistance in filling data gaps. 
How are these variables combined into each of the reform indexes? There are various 
aggregation methods available. Two obvious candidates are simple arithmetic averages 
and principal components. One major drawback of simple averages is that when we have 
so many different underlying variables in different units and scales, the ensuing values of 
the indexes would be difficult to interpret. One major drawback of principal components 
is that maximum and minimum values of the resulting indexes are entirely determined by 
the data and have no clear economic meaning.
14 For these two reasons, we choose to 
apply the methodology developed by Lora (1997). One important advantage of Lora’s 
method is that it has been developed and used previously for similar purposes (that is, to 
                                                           
13 The total cumulative number of private enterprises, total number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises privatized and total number of large enterprises privatized was normalized by the country’s 
population. 
14 Simple averages and principal components versions of our indexes are available upon request.         Reform Redux: 




capture various reform efforts across countries and over time). A major advantage of the 
Lora transformation is that the reference point is within the sample. In other words, this 
method does not require us to benchmark reform efforts against an ideal “well-
functioning market economy”. Our reference point is the maximum reform effort 
observed across our sample of countries in the respective time window. The major cost of 
this choice is that enlarging the time window and/or the sample of countries can 
potentially affect the values of our indexes. Needless to say, we believe that this 
drawback is preferable to those of benchmarking against something that cannot be 
defined with sufficient precision, either across countries or over time.
15  
Our overall index I for i-th country is constructed as follows:  
























    (1) 
where V is the value of the j-th variable in the i-th country at time t. n stands for the 
number of years (typically 13) and m for the number of variables. Also note that 
1 , 0 ∈ V
 for all i, t, which is because we normalize the “raw” V value of the j-th variable 
by the maximum value observed in all countries at time t. Notice that, firstly, in the case 
of year-by-year indexes, we do not average over time and thus all terms containing n drop 
out. Secondly, the equation holds when higher values of the underlying variable indicate 
less reform (for the opposite case, the numerator becomes the difference between the 
actual value and the observed minimum). 
How do we separate out reform inputs from reform outcomes? The distinction between 
input and output variables is not always clear cut. When measuring reform, it is advisable 
to focus on the indicators that are directly under the control of the government (Rodrik, 
1996; Loayza and Soto, 2003). Including outcome indicators in the construction of 
aggregate reform indexes may introduce bias in estimating the degree of liberalization. 
This is so for the simple reason that outcome indicators can be the result of many things 
other than reform inputs.
16 In addition, it may well be the case that there is a time lag 
between reform inputs and reform outputs. Therefore, we construct input-only measures 
for the three reform policies yearly for 25 former communist economies, but also 
compute indicators combining inputs and outcomes as a robustness check. Our prior is 
that the correlations between the existing reform indexes will be lower with respect to our 
input-only indexes (which are the ones we prefer) than with respect to our indexes that 
combine reform inputs and outcomes. As noted below, our results support this statement, 
which can be taken as evidence that the existing subjective indicators do indeed mix 
                                                           
15 In aggregating the underlying variables, we must address the issue of weights. In our view, it is 
impossible to determine the “true” set of weights. Further, these weights probably change from country 
to country and over time. As a result, we decided it is more transparent to use equal weights for all 
underlying variables. This can clearly be improved upon, although it would be difficult to accomplish 
in a non-arbitrary manner. 
16 For instance, the share of trade with non-transition countries may be strongly affected by the 
geographical proximity to non-transition countries. Therefore this variable should not be included in an 
input-only index of external liberalization efforts. 12   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
inputs and outcomes (although we cannot be sure of that, as the precise lists of underlying 
variables are seldom provided).  
Notice also that in selecting reform outcomes variables we need to minimize the 
probability that a “true reform input” is mistakenly classified as a “reform outcome”. 
Therefore, the resulting list of reform outcomes should only contain variables that are 
clearly reform outcomes and, conversely, the list of reform inputs will contain variables 
for which a certain level of reform outcomes is present. The reason for doing this is to try 
to “stack the cards” against our indexes, as this will surely minimize the differences (over 
time and across countries) between ours and the existing reform measures. We consider 
as outcome indicators the following variables (the first column of Table 1 lists reform 
inputs, while the second lists reform outcomes). For internal liberalization, we single out 
as an outcome indicator the share of administered prices in the CPI. This is because this is 
a function of the share of non-administered prices in the CPI. Thus if the introduction of 
new goods is beyond the control of the government’s internal liberalization policies, so is 
the total number of goods (prices) in the economy. For external liberalization, we 
consider as outcome variables the share of trade with non-transition countries, openness, 
import duties as a percentage of tax revenues, tariff revenues as a percentage of imports 
and the taxes collected on international trade. For privatization, we consider as outcome 
variables the private sector share in GDP, credit to the private sector and private sector 
investment.  
How do input-only objective indexes of reform change across countries and over time? 
We make two general observations. The first is that the correlation coefficients among 
our measures of reforms are all significantly positive, but rather low. The correlation 
between internal and external liberalization is 0.48, that between internal liberalization 
and privatization is 0.39 and that between external liberalization and privatization is 0.66.  
The second observation refers to reform reversals. While reform measured by the World 
Bank and EBRD indexes is better portrayed as a smooth, uninterrupted process of 
continuous improvement (note that this is even more so when considering the cumulative 
version of those indexes), it is a much more turbulent process according to our measures. 
Ours show a fair amount of trial and error and experimentation, which translates into the 
occurrence of numerous reform policy reversals. This matters because reform reversals 
are at the heart of the theoretical literature (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). 
Merlevede (2003) calculates reform reversals using the EBRD indexes and reports 21 
cases in which the subsequent value of a reform indicator is lower than the current value 
(we also adopt this definition of reform reversal here). Because this is from a total of 237 
changes, it implies that reversals are observed in 8.9% of cases. Also note that Merlevede 
considers reversals across all nine EBRD reform indicators. Considering just our three 
indexes, we obtain a much larger number of reversals, we find: 42 reversals out of 295 
(14.2%) in the internal liberalization reform indicator; 61 reversals out of 300 (20.3%) in 
the external liberalization reform indicator; and 44 reversals out of 243 (18.1%) in the 
reform indicator for privatization efforts. Further, using the EBRD reform measures 
Merlevede (2003) finds that only half of the countries experienced reform reversals.         Reform Redux: 




According to our indexes basically all countries have experienced at least one reversal in 
one of the three reform dimensions we consider.
17  
3.1 Internal Liberalization Index 
Figure 1 shows our input-only internal liberalization index on a yearly basis for all the 25 
countries in our sample.
18 Overall, there is clear progress across countries over time in 
terms of the liberalization of prices and wages. Notice, however, that reform reversals 
abound, as for example, in Albania and Ukraine in 1997, Lithuania in 1995 and 
Uzbekistan in 1994. Most of these seem related to wage regulation, which plays a 
significant role in the index. For example, Lithuania according to our data stopped 
regulating wages in 1995 and consequently the value of the index increases accordingly. 
Similarly, a large drop in the value of the index for Uzbekistan is a result of the 
introduction of wage controls in July 1994 (Anderson and Pomfret, 2002). Albania 
deregulated wages in 1997, resulting in a large increase in the value of the index. Slovakia 
and Ukraine reintroduced wage regulation in the years 1997–1998 and the value of the 
index declines accordingly.
19 Because this particular index is composed of very few 
variables, which are equally weighted, any changes in the underlying variables will have 
large consequences in terms of the aggregate index.
20  
How do these measures compare to the existing indicators? Note that the EBRD 
liberalization indexes cover the years 1991–2001 and the World Bank index developed by 
de Melo et al. (1996) is available only for 1989–1997. Thus, correlation coefficients are 
based only on the years for which all the corresponding data are available. The correlation 
between our input-only internal liberalization index is 0.52 with the EBRD’s and 0.38 
with the World Bank’s, while the correlation between our index combining inputs and 
outcomes is 0.42 with the World Bank’s and 0.56 with the same EBRD index.
21 As noted, 
                                                           
17 Given the small numbers of reversals found by previous studies, it is common practice to comment 
on each of them. There are too many reform reversals in our data for us to comment on each of them 
individually (we do comment on a selected few below), so in the following section we provide an 
econometric analysis of the determinants of reform reversals.  
18 See the Appendix for country-specific data (also for external liberalization and privatization efforts). 
19 In terms of the overall ranking of countries, we find Kazakhstan highly placed. Although this is 
somewhat surprising, it can easily be explained by tracing the index through its underlying variables: 
Kazakhstan has the lowest number of goods subject to price regulation and the lowest possible score 
for wage regulation for all 25 countries during 7 of the 13 years (1989 to 2001). The second and third 
places are (less surprisingly) occupied by Estonia and Hungary, respectively, while at the bottom of the 
ranking we find Romania, Belarus, Russia and Moldova. Countries such as Albania and Georgia made 
great progress in terms of price and wage liberalization only more recently. On the other hand, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan seem to have moved towards greater regulation over time. Overall, the 
internal liberalization index seems unaffected by the exclusion of outcome variables and to splitting the 
time window. The Baltic countries and countries from the Caucasus seem to be slightly more 
liberalized in terms of price and wage regulation. Using the input-only index, we still find the ranking 
topped by Estonia, Kazakhstan and Hungary. At the bottom, we find Moldavia and Belarus, which few 
observers would find surprising. 
20 The source of most pre-1991 data for the former Soviet Union countries is national authorities.  
21 If we use only data in the period 1997–2001, the coefficient falls slightly to 0.49 for both our indexes 
(with and without outcome indicators). The correlation of our index with the WB index in the years 
1989–1994 is 0.42, or 0.38 excluding the outcome indicators. If we extend the WB index to include the 
years up to 1997, the corresponding correlation coefficient rises to 0.48 and 0.53 respectively. 14   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
while our measure is at first sight very similar to the EBRD’s, the correlation between 
them is lower than in the cases of external liberalization and privatization (see below).  
Figures 2 and 3 show the behaviour of our internal liberalization index over time when we 
divide the sample into two groups, namely Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS includes all 
former Soviet Union republics except the Baltic States. For the sake of comparison, we 
normalize the EBRD indexes, in that smaller values refer to less liberalization effort. We 
present the two indexes in Figures 1 to 3 below. Visual comparison suggests that the 
EBRD may have been somewhat more generous in rating internal liberalization in the 
CEECs vis-à-vis the CIS, and this may have been particularly so for the period 1989–
1995.  
3.2 External Liberalization Index 
Our external liberalization index is shown in Figure 4. It is worth noting that, as in the 
case of the internal liberalization index, the EBRD external index clearly indicates more 
liberalization on average than our index for all years but 2001 (although the gap between 
the measures early on is not as great as in the case of internal liberalization). Except for 
2001 (marginally), our indexes suggest that external liberalization efforts were less 
intensive, on average, than internal liberalization efforts.
22 
One issue that is important to keep in mind is that there is considerably more variation in 
terms of external liberalization both across countries and over time than is the case for 
internal liberalization, so a closer analysis of the trajectories of each country is 
worthwhile. We learn that there are more cases of policy reversal, but none of them are as 
severe as the ones seen for price liberalization. Admittedly, this may be caused by the 
smaller number of underlying variables for the latter measure. 
Examining the relative rankings, the results are in line with expectations both for the top 
and for the bottom countries. Indeed for the top three it is maybe mildly surprising that 
the Baltics are still such intensive reformers even in the very late transition years. The 
external liberalization indexes show that the highest average values were found for the 
Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia, while the lowest values were for Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Belarus. As noted, the correlation coefficients between our external 
liberalization and the EBRD’s and World Bank’s indexes are higher than for internal 
liberalization. The correlation with the World Bank’s is 0.73 and that with the EBRD’s is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Additionally, the correlation between our internal liberalization index with and without the outcome 
indicators stands at 0.97. 
22 In terms of the overall ranking of countries, we find Latvia on top, closely followed by Estonia (see 
Appendix  1). The third post is (maybe) surprisingly occupied by Kyrgyzstan. This is because of 
extremely high values for external reform effort from 1993 onwards across the range of 29 variables 
underlying our index. At the bottom of the ranking we have Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Albania. 
The greatest jump we observe in the value of index is for Turkmenistan in 1999. Examining the 
underlying variables, we find that Turkmenistan, inter alia, liberalized interest rates and abolished 
multiple exchange rates in 1999. Another example worth mentioning is Uzbekistan, which reintroduced 
severe exchange rate controls as a reaction to a balance of payments crisis in the autumn of 1996 
(Pomfret, 2000). This is reflected in a large decline in the value of its external liberalization index from 
0.32 in 1996 to 0.24 in 1997.         Reform Redux: 




0.81, while the same coefficients for our input-only external liberalization indexes are 
lower, at 0.65 and 0.79 respectively.
23  
Figures 4 to 6 show that our external liberalization index never “crosses” the EBRD index 
after 1991. In other words, the EBRD index indicates more liberalization on average than 
our index for almost all years. Again, the gap tends to be larger for the CEEC than for the 
former Soviet Union countries. 
3.3 Privatization Index 
Figure 7 presents our privatization index. Concerning country-specific results, it is worth 
noting that only Hungary and Poland privatized their economies, to a certain extent, 
before 1991. Generally, Hungary shows the greatest extent of privatization, followed by 
Slovakia, Macedonia and Latvia. On the other hand, Belarus and Turkmenistan have 
made the least progress with privatization. It is interesting to note that for the most 
intensive reformers in this respect the process is much less bumpier than in those 
countries which privatized their economy only partially (see Appendix 1). Further 
examining major changes in the values of the privatization measure, Hungary’s 
privatization revenues (normalized by GDP) increased sharply in 1995, resulting in a 
substantial improvement of the index (see Canning and Hare, 1996). The index declines 
sharply for Macedonia in 1994 and 1995 for a number of reasons, but principally because 
of a large reduction of credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, which falls 
from 45% to 23% from 1994 to 1995. 
We should also note that typically the values of our indexes are lower for privatization 
than for internal and external liberalization, which hints at a specific reform sequence 
adopted by these countries that entailed leaving privatization for later. The correlation 
between our privatization index and those from the EBRD is 0.8, or 0.66 if we exclude 
the outcome indicators. If we restrict the sample to 1997–2001, the simple correlation 
coefficients are 0.82 and 0.64 (after exclusion of the outcome indicators). The correlation 
with the 1989–1994 World Bank index is 0.52, or 0.43 after exclusion of the outcome 
indicators. The correlation coefficient between our privatization index with and without 
the outcome indicators is 0.94.  
Figures 7 to 9 show that our index of privatization efforts is also less optimistic than the 
assessment from the EBRD and World Bank. Interestingly, the difference between ours 
and the EBRD index for privatization is larger for the CEECs. Again, the CEECs seem to 
have been more aggressive privatization reformers than the CIS countries.  
 
                                                           
23 If we restrict the sample to 1997–2001, the correlation is somewhat higher at 0.81, or 0.79 excluding 
the outcome indicators. The correlation coefficient with the 1989–1994 World Bank index is 0.73, or 
0.65 excluding the outcome indicators. The correlations are almost unchanged if we use the 1989-1997 
World Bank index. They are 0.71 and 0.69 without the outcome indicators for our index. Finally, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.93 between our external liberalization index with and without outcome 
indicators.  16   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
4. Econometric Results  
The objective of this section is three-fold: firstly, we assess the factors that help explain 
structural reform dynamics across countries; secondly, we analyse the determinants of 
reform reversals; and thirdly, we use various econometric models from the literature and 
re-estimate with structural reform measures so as to have a sense of how much of an 
improvement our measures can deliver.  
4.1 Reform Determinants 
What are the main determinants of economic reform? Here we consider some of the key 
insights from the theoretical literature on the political economy of reform to throw light 
on the determinants of each of our three indicators. The literature discussed above has 
generated a number of hypotheses that have rarely been tested empirically (Roland, 
2000). One set of potential determinants is related to economic conditions: favourable 
changes in economic conditions (e.g. less unemployment) allow greater margins for the 
reforming government to compensate losers and thus implement “more reform” (Aghion 
and Blanchard, 1994). A closely related notion is that of the consequences of a sharp 
deterioration in economic conditions: an economic crisis increases the number of 
supporters (that is, potential winners) of reform (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Another 
well understood set of reasons relates to politics, e.g. more democratic countries would be 
able to implement more reform (because, for instance, democratic elections allow the 
monitoring of compensation promises). Further, less concentrated political power (an 
example would be communists losing seats in parliament) would be associated with the 
implementation of “more reform” (Hellman, 1998). 
Let us now turn to the econometric methodology. There are two main questions: (a) What 
are the factors that determine the dynamics of reform across countries and over time? And 
(b) is the set of determinants the same for each of the three reform areas (namely 
privatization and external and internal liberalization)? Based on the large case study 
evidence on reform dynamics cited above and on what we learned about this process in 
collecting the underlying data for our objective indexes and the holding attendant 
discussion with public officials, our prior is that these three reforms are driven by 
different factors. This is partly because we observe a distinct sequence of reforms. 
Internal liberalization happened immediately after the fall of communism (often with the 
exception of wage regulation). This was followed by external liberalization and then by 
privatization efforts. This sequence makes it unlikely that the same set of determinants 
would hold for each of our three different reform measures. Moreover, if there were an 
identical set of determinants there would be little reason to focus on individual reforms, as 
an aggregate index would be the right way to proceed. In our view, such strategy would 
not do justice to the complex dynamics we observe with respect to reform efforts across 
these countries over time (our results below corroborate this insight).  
         Reform Redux: 




In what follows, we will examine the determinants of each of the three reform areas 
separately.
24 We first estimate the following equation: 
        itc tc tc tc tc tc itc V IC Democracy Unempl GDPgrowth R ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0       
(2)  
where Ritc stands for our objective indexes of reform, with i denoting reform area 
(privatization, external or internal liberalization), t denoting year and c denoting country. 
GDPgrowthtc is the rate of real per capita GDP growth (in country c and year t), 
Unempltc is the unemployment rate, Democracytc is the Freedom House index of 
democracy (the continuous version from their Nations in Transit project), ICtc is a 
principal components index of initial conditions
25 and Vtc is a vector of auxiliary control 
variables. We expect the coefficient on GDP growth, unemployment and initial conditions 
to be positive (the hypotheses are that faster growth, higher unemployment and more 
favourable initial conditions are more conducive to the implementation of reform) and 
expect the coefficient on democracy to be negative (the hypothesis being that democracy 
is more conducive to the implementation of reform). 
Table 2 has our econometric results on the determinants of each of our three indexes of 
reform. The first three columns show these results for our internal liberalization index. In 
this case, the Hausman test indicates that the random-effects estimator is appropriate. The 
results in column 1 broadly confirm our hypotheses: GDP growth, unemployment and 
democracy all exert a positive and statistically significant impact on internal liberalization 
efforts. The addition of initial conditions (reported in the next column) has little impact on 
those coefficients. Yet, the results suggest that countries with more favourable initial 
conditions are more likely to implement internal liberalization reforms. Also notice the 
substantial increase in the R-squared once initial conditions are accounted for. In the third 
column we add a Herfindahl index of concentration of political power (referring to the 
number of seats in the lower house). Although this addition proves to be of interest (we 
find that in parliaments in which political power is less concentrated, reforms move 
further), the coefficients on growth and unemployment are now less precisely estimated.   
The next set of columns has the results for external liberalization. In this case we have a 
more robust set of determinants in that now GDP growth, unemployment and democracy 
all have the expected effects. It is interesting to note that while the effect of democracy is 
smaller for internal liberalization than for external liberalization and privatization, this is 
inverted with regard to initial conditions. We believe this is in part because of the timing 
of these reforms: internal liberalization takes root much faster than external and 
privatization, thus leaving little time for the process of democratization to play a fuller 
                                                           
24 An instrumental variable estimator is employed. We also estimated the equations with lagged 
regressors and obtained largely the same results, which are available upon request. We also introduced 
squared unemployment and squared GDP, but failed to find them significant. One reason for 
introducing the squared variables is to disentangle the theories of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and 
Aghion and Blanchard (1994), who put forward that better (or worse in the case of the latter theory) 
economic conditions foster more reform.  
25 The initial conditions are a measure of the macroeconomic distortions as of 1989 and are constructed 
in line with, among others, EBRD (2002) and Merlevede (2003). 18   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
role (notice, however, that low concentration of political power is an important 
determinant in this respect), with a similar reasoning applying for the role of initial 
conditions on privatization (the latter generally takes place too late for the effect of those 
initial conditions to be fully felt). Also notice that we report that the growth of OECD 
countries, as a measure of global economic conditions, is an important reform 
determinant in this case: external liberalization is more likely to be implemented under 
favourable global economic conditions.  
As can also be seen from Table 2, the results for privatization are in line with those for 
external liberalization. GDP growth, unemployment rates and initial conditions show a 
positive and significant impact, while the coefficient on democracy also accords with our 
priors. It should be noted that there are important endogeneity issues, to which we return 
in section 4.3. For example, the consistent result we obtain showing that higher 
unemployment rates are associated with more reform efforts can be understood in 
conflicting manners: it may well be that rising unemployment enlarges the ranks of 
potential winners and thus increases the support for reform, leading to the intensification 
of reform efforts (which is, as noted above, consistent with the Fernandez and Rodrik 
model), or it may be that reform directly causes a (temporary) increase in the rate of 
unemployment (consider the case of privatization).  
We subjected the results above to various sensitivity checks (see the tables in the 
Appendix). We find that greater inflation rates decrease external liberalization and 
privatization efforts (but not internal liberalization). We also investigate the role of 
financial crisis (measured as the weighted average of exchange rate pressure and interest 
rate differentials) and do not find that it affects our reform indicators, with the somewhat 
surprising exception of privatization (similarly, fiscal deficit is never statistically 
significant). We also examined a number of political issues. EU negotiations (a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 from the year when EU accession negotiations started) are 
found to affect positively external liberalization as well as privatization efforts, but not 
internal liberalization. This is maybe a consequence of price and wage liberalization 
occurring well before the negotiations started. The occurrence of violent conflict was 
found to have a surprisingly limited impact: controlling for initial conditions in our 
baseline specifications, the coefficient on wars is statistically significant at conventional 
levels only for the case of privatization. Following Frye and Mansfield (2004), we create 
a variable capturing the electoral calendar (the number of years until elections). 
Surprisingly, we find little evidence for the timing of elections driving any of our reform 
indicators except for external liberalization. Further, we employ various measures of 
changes in the government’s ideological orientation to address the potential effects of 
political alternation on reform. For this purpose we use the number of ideological 
alternations (e.g. from centre-left to centre-right) and the number of leadership changes.
26 
We find that cumulative leadership and political changes are positively associated with 
our three indexes of reform. Not surprisingly, for two of them (internal liberalization and 
                                                           
26 We are grateful to Branko Milanovic for these data. Ideological alternation is defined as any change 
of the government’s ideological orientation on a 16-cell ideological grid. Leadership change captures 
personal changes in the locus of power, whether it is a change of prime minister (due for example to a 
change in the governing majority) or a change of president. For details, see Hoff, Horowitz and 
Milanovic (2005).         Reform Redux: 




privatization) we find that these measures of political alternation substitute for 
democracy, as the latter becomes insignificant after the inclusion of any of the two 
alternation variables. Finally, we have undertaken a spatial econometrics exercise to 
examine the role of distance between countries. The idea here is to assess the possibility 
of reform contagion: whether countries are more likely to implement reform say because 
of learning from the experience of close neighbours or because reform in close 
neighbours directly induces domestic reform (consider the case of competition among 
countries for FDI inflows). However using various such measures (distance from 
Brussels, distance between capital cities, whether or not previously part of the Soviet 
Union), we fail to find that reforms are driven by how much other “close” countries 
reform. In a nutshell, with the exception of the political and ideological alternation 
variables, we find no robust additional determinant of reform efforts, while our principal 
results remained unchanged. 
4.2 Reform Reversals 
A second objective here is to try to explain reform reversals. One main motivation is that 
although reform reversals occupy a central place in the theoretical literature, there are, to 
the best of our knowledge, no systematic efforts to try to explain these reversals 
empirically. The potential reversibility of reforms plays a fundamental role in the 
theoretical normative political economy of reform literature. Most of these theoretical 
contributions attempt to devise ways of designing reform packages that have a low 
probability of reversal (see, for example, Dewatripont and Roland, 1995).
27  
Further, this gives us a way to assess the reliability of our new objective measures. It may 
well be the case that the larger number of reversals is not an indication of our indexes’ 
quality but, a critic may charge, they reflect the fact that these indexes are finely 
measured and small changes in the underlying variables as well as country and time 
coverage may have an undesirably large impact on our measures. One way to try to put 
aside this concern is to explain reversals: if we cannot provide a reasonable explanation, 
then they may be right. We try to model reversals in two ways. In the first a reversal is 
simply defined as a decrease in the value of any of our three indexes in two consecutive 
years (a dependent dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a reversal occurred, and 
zero otherwise), while in the second we consider a particular measure of the severity or 
persistence of reversals, namely how many times reversals have occurred consecutively 
(the dependent variable is 1 when a reversal occurred, 2 when reversals occurred in two 
consecutive years, and so on).  
One feature of the available indexes of reform is that, according to them, reform reversals 
seldom occur. Although this can be explained by well-informed policy-makers, other 
explanations include that there may be political pressure on the international 
organizations constructing these indexes not to lower previous scores, or that national 
authorities mistakenly understand the survey questions as referring to their cumulative 
                                                           
27 Some of the mechanisms devised to deal with this issue are compensating packages, gradual 
implementation of reform and adherence to institutions that commit to future transfers (or directly to 
the implementation of reforms associated with WTO or EU accession). 20   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
efforts. As such, the empirical analysis of reform reversals has been scarce, especially vis-
à-vis the central role it occupies in the theoretical literature. Using our indicators, we 
observe twice as many reversals as with other indexes As discussed, this may well be 
caused by the fact that our objective indicators are measuring reform too finely, or it may 
also be caused by the non-availability of a few variables for that particular year (as the 
panel data set for the underlying variables is in some cases unbalanced). 
What explains reform reversals in these economies?
28 It is important to note that in the 
empirical literature this question has not been raised, as Merlevede (2003) is concerned 
mainly about the impact of reversals on growth. One reason for reform reversals is 
unfavourable changes in economic conditions. An economic crisis or a sudden increase in 
unemployment or a slowdown in growth rates may change the support for reform and 
cause a reversal. Another potential reason is a change in political conditions. For instance, 
if we observe major turnovers of the leading party in government, then reversals are likely 
(a left-wing government that succeeds a right-wing government may favour re-
distribution or compensation).  
In this light, we estimate a random-effects logit model in which the dependent variable is 
coded 1 if there was a reform reversal in that indicator in that year for that country, and 
zero otherwise. In the following model we investigate political and economic factors as 
potential explanations for reform reversals: 
) ( ) 1 ( 4 3 2 1 0 tc tc tc tc itc V Democracy Unempl GDPgrowth reversal P β β β β β + + + + Φ = =  
(3)
29 
where reversalitc is a binary variable indicating whether reform i in country c in year t has 
experienced a reversal (defined as a decline in the absolute value of the index); 
GDPgrowthtc is the rate of real per capita GDP growth (in country c and year t), 
Unempltc is the unemployment rate, Democracytc is the Freedom House index of 
democracy; Vtc is a vector of auxiliary control variables; and Φ is the cumulative logistic 
distribution function. Note that this means we do not expect the reform determinants we 
found above to play a role for reversals. By performing a separate analysis of the bottom 
half of the distribution of our reform indicators we expect they are driven by different 
factors than the mean itself. If that turns out to be the case, we gather additional support 
for the reliability of our measures. Yet failing to explain reversals would suggest that our 
measures are maybe too fine and are not reflecting changes in reform efforts but are 
picking up mostly noise. Accordingly, we should expect that the majority of the 
                                                           
28 Notice that this exercise differs from the one on reform dynamics above. The latter explains both 
positive and negative variations from the mean. Its validity is an empirical question: if the set of 
determinants turns out to be different between reform efforts and reform reversals this should reinforce 
the confidence we can attach to our measures. The latter also captures a sense of the magnitude of these 
variations (including reversals of course). However, in this exercise we treat all reversals in the same 
way, giving equal weight to small and large reversals in trying to explain their occurrence. In our view, 
this stacks the odds against our indicators and as such is a conservative test of their usefulness and 
reliability. 
29 For convenience, we simplify this notation, as if there were no country effects. More precisely, the 
random effects maximum likelihood estimator of the parameters for this model – which we employ – 
does not have a closed-form solution and the solution is obtained numerically using quadrature 
methods. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for further details.          Reform Redux: 




explanations will come from the vector of auxiliary control variables, ideally with 
individual variables playing a role for the reversals of each of our three individual reform 
measures.  
The first columns of Table 3 show our baseline results for internal liberalization reversals. 
These seem driven primarily by political factors, specifically by a direct form of protest 
(labour strikes). In some specifications, high rates of unemployment are associated with 
the likelihood of reversals, but this result is not robust. The significance of labour strikes 
points to the importance of a better grasp of initial political conditions in understanding 
reform dynamics. It also highlights the timing of reforms: because internal liberalization 
(according to our indexes) was implemented before external liberalization and 
privatization, the most effective way to revert internal liberalization may have been by 
direct influence.  
The results with respect to our two other indexes are intuitive. We find for privatization 
reversals that the main explanatory factor is FDI inflows, while those factors explaining 
external liberalization are average growth rates of OECD economies (an increase in those 
rates implies a higher probability of reversal), while terms of trade shocks show a 
negative impact in the probability of reversal.  
Table 4 repeats these specifications, but instead of explaining whether or not a reversal 
occurred, we try to understand the persistence (or duration) of reform reversals. We report 
random-effects negative binomial estimates in which the dependent variable is the 
number of consecutive years for which we observe a reform reversal. Interestingly, the 
results for persistence are in line with those for reversals: labour strikes explain the 
persistence of internal liberalization reversals, OECD growth explains the persistence of 
external liberalization reversals and FDI inflows explain the persistence of privatization 
reversals. 
We subjected these results to various sensitivity checks. Although we find that our main 
results are indeed robust to the inclusion of a number of important variables, none of them 
proved to be systematically related to reform reversals. We find no systematic effects 
from inflation, financial crises, fiscal deficit, EU negotiations, war, the timing of 
elections, ideological alternations, the number of leadership changes, and distance from 
Brussels, distance between capital cities, and whether or not previously part of the Soviet 
Union as measures of distance in our spatial econometrics exercise (see the Appendix). 
The results are similar with respect to the persistence of reform reversals, with three 
exceptions. Two of them concern the external liberalization index: we find that inflation 
and proximity as measured by being a former Soviet Union republic increase the 
persistence (or severity) of external liberalization reversals. We also find that ideological 
alternation tends to increase the persistence of internal liberalization reversals. In sum, we 
find no robust additional determinants of reform reversals (or of their persistence), while 
our principal results remain unchanged. 
In addition, it is vital to note that we have also re-estimated all our results with EBRD 
reform indexes and reform reversals calculated from these indexes. While in general the 22   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
reform determinants do not yield qualitatively different results, the EBRD indexes fail to 
find any significant determinant for privatization reversals and to a certain extent also for 
external liberalization. On the other hand, the EBRD indexes do a good job in explaining 
the internal liberalization reversals and their persistence. Our results in sections 4.1 and 
4.2 are robust to re-defining the beginning of the sample. More specifically, the results are 
qualitatively unchanged if we define the starting year of transition as the year for which 
the country experienced the largest GDP fall.  
4.3 Endogeneity Issues: Do These New Indexes Change the Existing Results? 
We believe that the two sets of results above (on the determinants of reform dynamics and 
on reform reversals) suggest that our indexes are useful and reliable in improving our 
understanding of reform. Yet, the literature on the economic effects of reform has long 
recognized that growth and reform may be jointly determined. The reform is carried out 
in the expectation that it will translate into faster growth rates, while a growing economy 
enables a reformist government to compensate losers from reform and thus continue, or 
even intensify, reforms. There is also the notion that the impact of reform on growth 
occurs with a lag: the contemporaneous effect of reforms on growth may be negative, 
while the lagged effect may be positive. It is thus important to investigate what are the 
ultimate consequences, in terms of existing econometric results, of using our indexes 
(note that in this section in order to replicate previous studies, we use an overall reform 
index, which is a simple average of our three indexes – internal and external liberalization 
and privatization). Moreover, our results so far do not reflect the concerns expressed in 
the more recent literature regarding endogeneity and robustness. One way to address such 
issues is to directly re-estimate some of the “reform equations” from the literature using 
our reform indicators instead and compare the ensuing coefficients. Also, there is now a 
somewhat sizable literature on the effects of reform on growth, which has, generally 
speaking, found a positive impact of reform on growth when reform is proxied by the 
subjective indicators we discussed above. It is also important to investigate whether our 
objective indexes change these results.  
We select four well-known papers which report a “first-stage” reform equation.
30 To this 
end, Table 5 contains the “reform equations”, while Table 6 has the corresponding 
“growth equations”. The reform equations we re-estimate are originally from Heybey and 
Murrell (1998), Merlevede (2003), Falcetti, Raiser and Sanfey (2002) and Kim and 
Pirttila (2003). It is worth noting that we use the same variables in the replication, except 
we change the reform measure used by the authors for our aggregate index of reform.
31 
Heybey and Murrell (1998) specify reform (as measured by the World Bank indexes 
discussed above) as a function of economic growth, democracy as measured by the 
Freedom House index, the extent of initial economic liberalization and the share of 
manufacturing in GDP. Their results are reproduced in the second column of Table 5: 
                                                           
30 Notice that all of these are part of a system of equations (that is, they are all estimated jointly with a 
growth equation), which if reported in the original paper is also replicated in the present study. 
31 In order to replicate these results we need to generate an aggregate index of overall reform effort 
(which is done using the Lora algorithm described above and averaging the three reform indexes we 
computed).         Reform Redux: 




although economic growth facilitates the implementation of economic reforms, an 
extensive history of reform attempts seems to be a hindrance (maybe reflecting Kornai’s 
“reform windmill”). Using our reform indexes, we are able to reproduce their results with 
respect to the initial level of liberalization and indeed strengthen them in the sense that the 
coefficient is larger and estimated more precisely. Yet, we could not reproduce the result 
for economic growth.
32  
Merlevede (2003) analyses the impact of reform reversals. The paper reports the 
coefficients from a reform equation. Merlevede’s data show that reform (measure by the 
EBRD indexes) is driven by contemporaneous economic growth and democracy as 
measured by the inverted Freedom House index (in the inverted index, higher figures 
indicate more democracy). He reports that initial conditions matter in explaining reform 
dynamics. Using our reform indexes, we are able to replicate the finding that democracy 
is an important factor in driving reform. However, we do find that although 
contemporaneous growth is positively associated with reform progress, lagged economic 
growth turns out to be inversely related to reform. The latter result is usually interpreted 
as supporting the notion that economic crises are important determinants of reform. 
Finally, we find little support for the role of initial conditions. 
As can also be seen from Table 5, one main feature of the reform equation from Falcetti, 
Raiser and Sanfey (2002) is the comprehensiveness of initial conditions.
33 Our reform 
indexes not only reproduce the growth effects reported by Falcetti et al., but also are in 
this case estimated more precisely and the size of the coefficients is once again larger. 
The situation with respect to democracy is similar, though the size of the coefficient is 
smaller. One main difference is that we find little evidence supporting the notion that 
initial conditions play a significant role in explaining reform dynamics.  
The last reform equation in Table 5 is from Kim and Pirttila (2003). It explains reform 
dynamics using various macroeconomic variables. More specifically, growth and budget 
surpluses are expected to foster reform efforts (because, for instance, both increase the 
government’s credibility in terms of compensating potential losers) and unemployment 
and inflation are expected to hinder reform efforts (because, for instance, both increase 
individual and aggregate uncertainty, as in Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). Our reform 
indexes not only reproduce the growth effect reported by Kim and Pirttila (2003), but also 
estimate it more precisely and, once again, the value of the coefficient is larger than in the 
original. Interestingly, however, we find opposite results with respect to unemployment: 
in ours, changes in the rate of unemployment (note that the Arellano-Bond estimate refers 
to variables in first differences) are associated with an increase in reform efforts. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on inflation and unemployment both have the same sizes as 
in Kim and Pirttila, but also opposite signs.  
                                                           
32 The replication results for Heybey and Murrell’s growth equation are available upon request. 
33 Following this literature, we used the principal components method to cluster the initial conditions 
into two groups. The first, denoted by IC1, is interpreted as capturing the macroeconomic distortions 
inherited from socialism, as the largest loadings are for the exchange rate black market premium before 
1989, repressed inflation during 1987–1990 and the share of CMEA trade in GDP in 1990. The second 
cluster of initial conditions, IC2, can be interpreted as the level of socialist development, as the largest 
loadings are for real GDP per capita in 1989 and the share of the population in urban areas in 1990.  24   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
We now turn to the replication of the attendant growth equations to investigate whether 
using our reform indexes changes the existing results on the economic impact of reform. 
The growth equations we re-estimate are originally from Fidrmuc (2003), Merlevede 
(2003), Falcetti, Raiser and Sanfey (2002) and Kim and Pirttila (2003).  
The specification from Fidrmuc (2003) has as its main arguments contemporaneous 
reform, fiscal balance, school enrolment and investment rates, and involvement in armed 
conflict. The first column in Table 6 shows Fidrmuc’s original coefficients, while the 
second column shows ours. As can be seen, our reform indicators are able to replicate all 
the original results, but with our measure these coefficients turn out to be larger and more 
precisely estimated (notice that originally the coefficient on investment was not 
statistically different from zero). 
The specifications from Falcetti et al. (2002) and from Merlevede (2003) are similar. The 
main difference is the latter having an additional dimension for initial conditions as well 
as a dummy variable capturing the occurrence of reform reversals. From the Falcetti et al. 
equation, we are able to replicate and improve upon the reform results (again more 
precisely estimated and larger). Note, however, that using our indicators, we find little 
support for the role of initial conditions or for the role of fiscal balances.
34 The outcome is 
similar with respect to Merlevede’s specification: the coefficients on our objective reform 
indicator are more precisely estimated and larger in size than in the original paper.  
Finally, the results from Kim and Pirttila (2003) are shown in the last two columns. These 
authors argue that growth is mainly driven by reform, cumulative reform, fiscal balance, 
investment and inflation. Using our new reform indexes, we are again able to replicate 
these results, although this was the only case in which our coefficients are slightly smaller 
and not in every case more precisely estimated.  
In sum, our new objective measures of reform seem able to replicate key results from the 
literature. These new measures show a much stronger effect on growth (contemporaneous 
and lagged), but a smaller (yet still significant) effect of cumulative reform. Crucially, re-
estimating some of the main growth equations from the literature using these new 
measures provides less support for initial economic conditions (raising, among other 
issues, the possibility that initial political conditions maybe a more important aspect, 
albeit one that has been largely neglected so far). 
5. Conclusions 
This paper tries to contribute to the growing literature on the political economy of reform. 
There have been very few efforts to take the many theoretical insights to the data. This is 
in part because reform is a political economy topic par excellence: reform is 
multidimensional and it is driven by the complex interplay of political and economic 
forces. The transition from communism to capitalism in Central Europe and the former 
                                                           
34 It is important to keep in mind that in replicating these results, we have measured the variables used, 
mimicked the specifications and chosen exactly the same estimators. In other words, to the best of our 
abilities, everything but the reform measures is exactly the same as in the original papers.          Reform Redux: 




Soviet Union is arguably the largest natural experiment on economic reform in recent 
history and it is paradoxical to say the least that efforts to systematically measure such 
reform efforts have not emerged. In particular, the fact that objective indicators of reform 
are still unavailable is, in our view, a reason for serious concern. This paper tries to 
address this gap by constructing measures for three main reform areas in all transition 
economies for all years from 1989 to 2001. Compared to the existing (subjective) indexes, 
our measures not only generate a less optimistic assessment of the reform process, but 
also depict this process as being much less smooth than previously thought (more 
specifically, according to our measures reform reversals abound, while that is not the case 
with the subjective measures). We also believe this is one of the first papers to try to 
implement empirically the distinction between reform effort inputs and outcomes. This 
distinction is important because the inclusion of outcome indicators can severely bias the 
resulting measures. Among the main determinants of reform, we find domestic growth for 
external liberalization and privatization, concentration of political power for internal 
liberalization, and democracy for all three of them. We also find that FDI inflows reduce 
the probability of privatization reversals, labour strikes increase that of internal 
liberalization reversals, and OECD growth increases that of external liberalization 
reversals. Finally, we replicate the results from the main econometric studies of the 
effects of reform on growth and find that those effects, using our objective measures of 
reform, are larger, more precisely estimated and more robust. 
In terms of future work, the main suggestions we offer are as follows. First, it is important 
to provide objective indicators for more reforms, while simultaneously offering a more 
disaggregated look at the three main reforms we focused on here. For instance, future 
work should separate out wage from price liberalization in order to throw light on their 
seemingly very different dynamics. Our results give us reason to suspect, for instance, 
that the factors explaining reversals in the two sub-components of our internal 
liberalization indexes will be rather different. In terms of additional reforms that we 
believe should be examined, those of a more institutional nature that fall under the 
heading “second generation reforms” should be given top priority. These encompass 
important areas such as competition policy, anti-corruption initiatives and judiciary 
reform. The second main suggestion we offer for future research builds upon the first: to 
study interdependencies between the reform areas (that is, to focus on the issues of 
sequencing and speed of reforms). Because we have focused on few reform areas, the 
number of potential sequences of reform is limited. Further, because these are defined 
broadly there is maybe too blurred a consensus from the data on the actual choice of 
sequences. Future research would do well to examine the relationship between objective 
indicators of reform in more areas and attempt to identify differences in their sequencing 
and speed so as to allow a well-informed discussion (based on data and facts) of the 
possible relationship between the different reform speeds and sequences, on the one hand, 
and political development, reform outcomes and aggregate economic performance, on the 
other.  
 26   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
References 
ABIAD, ABDUL, AND ASHOKA MODY, 2005. “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?” 
American Economic Review, 95, 66–88. 
ACEMOGLU,  DARON,  SIMON  JOHNSON AND JAMES  ROBINSON,  2006. “Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf (eds.): 
Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier. 
ANDERSON, KATHRYN, AND RICHARD POMFRET, 2002. “Gradual Economic Reform and Well-
Being in Uzbekistan,” in Lu Aiguo and M. Montes (eds.): Poverty, Income Distribution and 
Well-being in Asia During the Transition, UNU/WIDER Studies in Development Economics 
and Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, 187–214. 
AGHION, PHILIPPE, AND OLIVIER BLANCHARD, 1994.  “On the Speed of Transition in Central 
Europe,” in Stanley Fischer and Julio Rotemberg (eds.): NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
1994. Cambridge: MIT Press, 283–320. 
ALESINA, ALBERTO, AND ALLAN DRAZEN, 2001. “Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?” American 
Economic Review, 81, 1170–1188. 
ÅSLUND, ANDERS, PETER BOONE AND SIMON JOHNSON, 1996. “How to Stabilize: Lessons from 
Post-Communist Countries,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 217–291. 
ASILIS, CARLOS, AND GIAN MARIA MILESI-FERRETTI, 1994. “On the Political Sustainability of 
Economic Reform,” IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessment: PPAA/94/3.  
BARTHOLDY, KASPER, 1997. “Old and New Problems in the Estimation of National Accounts in 
Transition Economies,” Economics of Transition, 5(1), 131–146. 
BERG, ANDREW, EDUARDO BORENZSTEIN, RATNA SAHAY AND JERONIM ZETTELMEYER, 1999. 
“The Evolution of Output in Transition Economies: Explaining the Differences,” IMF 
Working Papers, 99/73. 
BHATTACHARYA, RINA, 1997. “Pace, Sequencing and Credibility of Structural Reforms,” World 
Development, 25(7), 1045–1061. 
BODENSTEIN,  THILO,  THOMAS  PLUMPER AND GERALD  SCHNEIDER,  2003.  “Two Sides of 
Economic Openness: Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade and Capital Controls in Transition 
Countries, 1993-2000,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36, 231–243.  
CAMERON,  COLIN  A., AND PRAVIN  TRIVEDI,  2005.  Microeconometrics: Methods and 
Applications, Cambridge University Press. 
CAMPOS, NAURO, AND FABRIZIO CORICELLI, 2002. “Growth in Transition: What We Know, What 
We Don’t, and What We Should,” Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 793–836. 
BABETSKII,  JAN, AND NAURO  CAMPOS,  2007.  “Does Reform Work?” Czech National Bank 
Working Paper No. 2/2007. 
CANNING, ANNA, AND PAUL HARE, 1996.  “Political Economy of Privatization in Hungary: A 
Progress Report,” Center for Economic Reform and Transformation Discussion Paper No. 13.          Reform Redux: 




CASTANHEIRA,  MICAEL AND GÉRARD  ROLAND,  2000.  “The Optimal Speed of Transition: A 
General Equilibrium Analysis,” International Economic Review, 41(1), 219–239. 
COLLIER, PAUL, AND JAN WILLEM GUNNING, 1999. “The IMF’s Role in Structural Adjustment,” 
Economic Journal, 109(459): F634–651.  
CUKIERMAN, ALEX, AND MARIANO TOMASSI, 1998. “When Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?” 
American Economic Review, 88, 180–197. 
DE MELO, MARTHA, CEBDET DENIZER AND ALAN GELB, 1996. “Patterns of Transition from Plan 
to Market,” World Bank Economic Review, 10(3), 397–424. 
DEWATRIPONT,  MATHIAS, AND GERARD  ROLAND,  1992.  “The Virtues of Gradualism and 
Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy,” Economic Journal, 102, 291–300. 
DEWATRIPONT, MATHIAS, AND GERARD ROLAND, 1995. “The Design of Reform Packages under 
Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, 85(5), 1207–1223. 
DRAZEN, ALLAN, AND WILLIAM EASTERLY, 2001. “Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical 
Test for Conventional Wisdom,” Economics and Politics, 13(2), 129–157. 
DRAZEN, ALLAN, AND VITTORIO GRILLI, 1993. “The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms,” 
American Economic Review, 83(3), 598–601. 
DRAZEN, ALLAN, 2000. Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton University Press. 
EASTERLY, WILLIAM, 2006. “National Policies and Economic Growth: A Reappraisal,” in Philippe 
Aghion and Steven Durlauf (eds.): Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier. 
EUROPEAN  BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT  (EBRD)  (VARIOUS YEARS), 
Transition Report, London: EBRD. 
GLAESER,  EDWARD,  RAFAEL  LA  PORTA,  FLORENCIO  LOPEZ DE SILANES AND ANDREI 
SCHEILFER,  2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 
271–303. 
GOODHUE,  RACHAEL,  GORDON  RAUSSER AND LEO  SIMON,  1998. “Privatization, Market 
Liberalization and Learning in Transition Economies,” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 80(4), 724–737. 
FALCETTI, ELISABETTA, MARTIN RAISER AND PETER SANFEY, 2002. “Defying the Odds: Initial 
Conditions, Reforms, and Growth in the First Decade of Transition,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 30(2), 229–250.  
FERNANDEZ, RAQUEL, AND DANI RODRIK, 1991. “Resistance of Reform: Status Quo Bias in the 
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, 81, 1146–1155. 
FIDRMUC,  JAN,  2003. “Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth during Post-communist 
Transition,” European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 583–604. 
FISCHER,  STANLEY,  RATNA  SAHAY AND CARLOS  VEGH,  1996. “Stabilization and Growth in 
Transition Economies: The Early Experience,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2), 45–
66.  28   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
FISCHER, STANLEY, AND RATNA SAHAY, 2004. “Transition Economies: The Role of Institutions 
and Initial Conditions,” Festschrift in Honour of Guillermo A. Calvo, International Monetary 
Fund, April 15–16, 2004.  
FRYE,  TIMOTHY, AND ED  MANSFELD,  2004. “Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade 
Liberalization in the Post-Communist World,” Comparative Political Studies, 37, 371–398. 
HELLMAN, JOEL S., 1998. “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist 
Transitions,” World Politics, 50, 203–234.  
HEYBEY, BERTA, AND PETER MURRELL, 1999. “The Relationship between Economic Growth and 
the Speed of Liberalization During Transition,” Journal of Policy Reform, 3(2) 121–137. 
HOFF,  KARLA,  SHALE  HOROWITZ AND BRANKO  MILANOVIC,  2005. “Transition from 
Communism: Political Alternation as a Restraint in Investing in Influence,” mimeo.  
KAMINSKY, GRACIELA, AND SERGIO SCHMUKLER, 2003. “Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: The 
Effects of Financial Liberalization,” IMF Working Papers 03/34, International Monetary 
Fund.  
KIM, BYUNG-YEON, AND JUKKA PIRTTILA, 2003. “The Political Economy of Reforms: Empirical 
Evidence from Post-Communist Transition in the 1990s,” BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 4, 
Bank of Finland. 
KRUEGER, GARY, AND MAREK CIOLKO, 1998. “A Note on Initial Conditions and Liberalization 
during Transition,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 26(4), 718–734. 
KUCZYNSKI,  PEDRO-PABLO, AND JOHN  WILLIAMSON  (EDS.),  2003.  After the Washington 
Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, Washington D.C.: IIE.  
LIPTON, DAVID, AND JEFFREY SACHS, 1990. “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The 
Case of Poland,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990 (1), 75–133. 
LOAYZA,  NORMAN, AND RAIMUNDO  SOTO,  2004. “On the Measurement of Market-Oriented 
Reforms,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 3371.  
LOAYZA, NORMAN, ANA OVIEDO AND LUIS SERVEN, 2005. “Regulation and Macroeconomic 
Performance,” World Bank WPS 3469. 
LORA,  EDUARDO,  1997. “What Makes Reforms Likely? Timing and Sequencing of Structural 
Reforms in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper 424. 
LORA, EDUARDO, 2001. “Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How 
to Measure It,” Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper 466.  
MARTINELLI, CESAR, AND MARIANO TOMMASI, 1998. “Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the 
Presence of Political Constraints,” in M. Tommasi and F. Sturzenegger (eds.): The Political 
Economy of Economic Reforms, MIT Press. 
MORLEY, SAMUEL, ROBERTO MACHADO AND STEFANO PETTINATO, 1999. “Indexes of Structural 
Reform in Latin America,” CEPAL Serie Reformas Economicas, 12.         Reform Redux: 




MEGGINSON¸  WILLIAM, AND JEFFREY  NETTER,  2001. “From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 321–389. 
MERLEVEDE,  BRUNO,  2003. “Reform Reversals and Output Growth in Transition Economies,” 
Economics of Transition, 11(4), 597–751. 
MURPHY, KEVIN, ANDREI SHLEIFER AND ROBERT VISHNY, 1992. “The Transition to a Market 
Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 889–906. 
NAVIA, PATRICIO, AND ANDRES VELASCO, 2003. “The Politics of Second Generation Reforms,” in 
P.-P. Kuczynski and J. Williamson (eds.): After the Washington Consensus – Restarting 
Growth and Reform in Latin America. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. 
NICOLETTI, GIUSEPPE, AND STEFANO SCARPETTA, 2003. “Regulation, Productivity and Growth: 
OECD Evidence,” Economic Policy, April 18 (36), 9–72.  
PERSSON, TORSTEN, AND GUIDO TABELLINI, 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic 
Policy, MIT Press. 
POMFRET, RICHARD, 2000. “The Uzbek Model of Economic Development 1991–99” Economics of 
Transition, 8(3), 733–748.  
RODRIK, DANI, 1996. “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
34(1), 9–41.  
RODRIK, DANI, 2005. “Why We Learn Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies,” 
mimeo, Harvard University. 
ROLAND, GERARD, 2000. Politics, Firms, Markets: Transition and Economics, MIT Press.  
SCHRODER, PHILIPP, 2001. “On the Speed and Boundaries of Structural Adjustment When Fiscal 
Policy is Tight,” Economic Systems, 25(4), 345–364.  30   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
Appendix












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
  












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 
Notes: CH stands for the reform indicator developed in this paper, CEEC refers to the Central and Eastern 
European and Baltic countries, while CIS refers to the former Soviet Union countries.        Reform Redux: 
















1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 
Notes: CH stands for the reform indicator developed in this paper, CEEC refers to the Central and Eastern 
European and Baltic countries, while CIS refers to the former Soviet Union countries.32   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 












1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CH EBRD
 
Notes: CH stands for the reform indicator developed in this paper, CEEC refers to the Central and Eastern 
European and Baltic countries, while CIS refers to the former Soviet Union countries.        Reform Redux: 










Internal Liberalization Index   
1.  Number of goods subject to price regulation (basket 
of 15 goods)  
2.  Wage regulation 
3.  Share of administered prices in 
CPI 
 
External Liberalization Index   
1.  Compatibility with Article VIII 
2.  Controls on commercial credit 
3.  Controls on foreign direct investment 
4.  Controls on liquidation of FDI  
5.  Documentation requirements for release of foreign 
exchange for imports 
6.  Exchange rate taxes 
7.  Export duties as % of tax revenue 
8.  Export licences 
9.  Export taxes 
10. Import licences and quotas 
11. Import tariff rate 
12. Interest rate liberalization 
13. Investment transactions 
14. Multiple exchange rates 
15. OECD membership 
16. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held 
abroad by residents  
17. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held 
domestically by residents 
18. Permission of foreign exchange accounts for non-
residents  
19. Repatriation requirements 
20. Repatriation requirements for invisible transactions  
21. Surrender requirements  
22. Surrender requirements for invisible transactions  
23. Tariff code lines  
24. WTO membership  
 
25. Share of trade with non-
transition countries 
26. Openness 
27. Import duties as % of tax 
revenue 
28. Tariff revenues as % of 
imports and taxes on 
international trade 
29. Tax revenues from 
international trade 
 
Privatization Index   
1.  Privatization revenues  
2.  Share of small firms privatized 
3.  Asset share of private-owned banks (in %) 
4.  Total number of enterprises privatized  
5.  Total number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises privatized  
6.  Total number of large enterprises privatized  
7.  Share of foreign-owned banks in total number of 
banks 
8.  Total number of private enterprises  
 
 
9.  Private sector share in GDP 
10. Credit to private sector  
11. Private sector investment as % 
of GDP  
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Table 2: What Drives Reform? Panel Estimates 
  
CH Index  
Internal Liberalization 
CH Index  
External Liberalization 
CH Index  
Privatization 
GDP growth  0.01***  0.01***  0.02***  0.01***  0.01***  0  0  0.02***  0 
   0  0  (0.01)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Unemployment -0,01  0  0.02*  0.01*  0.01**  0.01***  0.01***  0  0.01*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Democracy -0.09***  -0.06*  -0,03  -0.09*** -0.05**  -0.05** -0.05** -0.06**  -0.05** 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Initial conditions    -0.01*  -0.02***    -0.01***  -0,01  -0,01    -0,01 
     (0.01)  (0.01)    0  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01) 
Herfindahl index      -0.50**             
       (0.25)             
OECD growth            0.11**  0.11**    0.11** 
             (0.04) (0.04)    (0.04) 
Observations  237 237 176  218 218 218  218 214 218 
No. of countries  25  25  22  25  25  25  25  24  25 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, *** Statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
         Reform Redux: 





Table 3: What Explains Reform Reversals? Panel Logit Estimates 
 
CH Index Internal 
Reversal 
CH Index External 
Reversal 
CH Index Privatization 
Reversal 
Unemployment  0.045 0.050 0.038  0.062** 0.007  0.038 0.024 0.028 -0.029 
    [0.030] [0.040] [0.041]  [0.026] [0.027] [0.048] [0.027]  [0.031] [0.031] 
GDP growth  0.042  0.052*  0.058*  0.11**  0.031  0.002  -0.016  -0.012  -0.001 
    [0.028] [0.031] [0.031]  [0.054] [0.025] [0.034] [0.021]  [0.029] [0.029] 
Democracy  -0.042 -0.092 -0.076  -0.265 0.011  0.058  0.062 -0.029  -0.028 
    [0.109] [0.110] [0.041]  [0.213] [0.086] [0.151] [0.097]  [0.120] [0.125] 
Labour strikes    0.825**               
     [0.335]              
Labour strikes*Unempl.      0.112**             
       [0.040]             
Growth  OECD        1.28***  1.572***      
          [0.325]  [0.576]      
Terms of trade            -0.022*       
           [0.012]      
FDI            -0.229** -0.230** 
              [0.117]  [0.119] 
EU  negotiations             -0.026 
               [0.868] 
                
Observations  260 232 233  250 243  147 228 175  175 
No. of countries  25  24  24  23  25  25  25  25  25 
McFadden R-squared   0.13  0.24  0.25  0.41  0.25  0.69  0.10  0.33  0.33 
Method  RE RE RE  FE RE  RE RE RE  RE 


















Robust standard errors in brackets. * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, 
*** Statistically significant at 1% level. Fixed effects estimates reported if consistency of random effects is 
rejected by Hausman test at 5% level. 
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Table 4: What Explains the Persistence of Reform Reversals? Negative Binomial Estimates 
  
CH Index Internal 
 
CH Index External 
 
CH Index Privatization 
 
Unemployment  0.038 0.027 0.027 0.093* 0.001  0.019  0.023 0.023 0.023 
   [0.030]  [0.066]  [0.036]  [0.048]  [0.021] [0.041] [0.026]  [0.026]  [0.026] 
GDP growth  0.032  0.038  0.048*  0.079*** 0.052**  0.013  -0.009  -0.003  -0.033 
   [0.026]  [0.032]  [0.028]  [0.024]  [0.022] [0.031] [0.019]  [0.025]  [0.025] 
Democracy -0.053  -0.319*  -0.088  -0.150  0.055  0.098  0.600  -0.109  -0.021 
   [0.016]  [0.193]  [0.013]  [0.174]  [0.075] [0.132] [0.093]  [0.103]  [0.107] 
Labour strikes     0.647**                      
      [0.261]                      
Labour strikes*Unempl.        0.08***                   
         [0.014]                   
Growth OECD              0.816***  1.21**          
               [0.253]  [0.497]          
Terms of trade                 -0.014          
                  [0.01]          
FDI                       -0.239**  -0.238** 
                        [0.109]  [0.111] 
EU negotiations                          -0.044 
                           [0.784] 
Observations 260  172  233  250  243  147  228  175  175 
No. of countries  25  17  24  23  25  25  25  25  23 
McFadden R-squared   0.09  0.25  0.24  0.41  0.22  0.72  0.11  0.35  0.34 




(0.97)  --- 
7.01 











Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, *** 
Statistically significant at 1% level. Fixed effects estimates reported if consistency of random effects is rejected by 
Hausman test at 5% level. 
 
         Reform Redux: 




Table 5: Joint Estimation of Reform and Growth: Reform Stage Panel Results 
  Heybey Murrell  Merlevede  Falcetti et al.  Kim Pirttila 
   Original  With CH 
reform 
indexes 
Original With  CH 
reform 
indexes 
Original With  CH 
reform 
indexes 
Original With  CH 
reform 
indexes 
Growth  0.006*** 0.006 0.056***  0.035***  0.08***  0.36***  0.002  0.003** 
    [0.002] [0.03] [0.004]  [0.001] [0.01]  [0.05] [0.002]  [0.001] 
Growth – lagged        -0.003  -0.011*** -0.01***  -0.12***       
         [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.04]       
Time*IC1        -0.34***  0.004  -0.02***  0.004       
         [0.091]  [0.005]  [0.007]  [0.04]       
Time*IC2        -0.12  0.0001             
         [0.12]  [0.005]             
Freedom House  0.008  -0.014  0.81***  -0.049*** -0.15***  -0.05***       
   [0.005]  [0.1]  [0.32]  [0.014]  [0.06]  [0.01]       
Industry  0.13*  0.35                   
   [0.07]  [0.62]                   
Lib. index 1989  -0.2***  -0.63***                   
   [0.05]  [0.23]                   
Inflation                    0.007  -0.007 
                     [0.01]  [0.02] 
Unemployment                    -0.03***  0.02*** 
                     [0.01]  [0.007] 
Gov. balance                    0.002  0.002 
                     [0.002]  [0.003] 
R-2/Chi-sqr.  0.48  0.35  770*** 123*** 434*** 123***  0.59  0.23 
Estimation    3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% 
level, *** Statistically significant at 1% level. 38   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
 
 
Table 6: Joint Estimation of Reform and Growth: Growth Stage Panel Results 
   Fidrmuc  Falcetti et al.  Merlevede  Kim Pirttila 
 Original  With  CH 
reform 
indexes  
Original With  CH 
reform 
indexes 
Original With  CH 
reform 
indexes 
Original With  CH 
reform 
indexes 
Liberalization    23.3***  26.3***  -13.3 -48.6*** -8.35  -73.2***  -0.86  2.16 
 [6.65]  [4.1]  [8.26]  [13.5]  [10.84]  [19.1]  [0.81]  [1.74] 
Lib. index (lag)       10.84***  52.7***  10.79**  75.1***     
     [3.99]  [11.6]  [4.82]  [16.7]    
Time*IC1      0.27*** 0.06 0.78***  0.12     
     [0.09]  [0.09]  [0.16]  [0.1]    
Time*IC2        0.11  -0.09    
        [0.23]  [0.12]    
Fiscal  0.073  0.16 0.34***  0.09  0.22**  0.08 0.38*** -0.09 
  [0.11] [0.11] [0.12]  [0.08]  [0.1]  [0.1]  [0.13]  [0.1] 
School    0.019  -0.02          
  [0.137]  [0.04]          
Investment  0.104  0.001**        0.24***  -0.0001 
  [0.244]  [0.0003]        [0.05]  [0.0002] 
War  -5.97***  -12.7***          
  [1.729]  [2.99]          
Reform  reversal          25.47*  111.7***    
        [13.55]  [28.1]    
Growth  –  lagged           0.37**  0.29*** 
           [0.11]  [0.1] 
Cum  lib.  index           9.04***  3.07* 
           [3.4]    [1.46] 
Fiscal  –  lagged           -0.92  0.55*** 
           [0.89]  [0.21] 
Inflation  –  lagged           0.52  0.01 
           [1.13]  [0.16] 
R2/Chi-squared  0.76  0.28 241*** 196*** 411***  170***  3263***  1238*** 
Estimation    FE  FE 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS  3SLS AB  AB 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, *** 
Statistically significant at 1% level. AB stands for Arellano-Bond estimator.         Reform Redux: 





Reform Indicators – Raw Data 
 
 
Table A1: Input-only Yearly Index of Internal Liberalization for 25 Transition Economies (Lora Transformation) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Average   
Albania  0 0 0 0  0.17  0.17  0.37  0.4  0.9  0.9  0.8  1 1  0.44 
Armenia  0  0  0  0.8  0.86 0.87  0.9  0.93 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.96  0.7 
Azerbaijan            0.22 0.56 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.58 0.58 0.91  0.69 
Belarus  0  0  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5  0.58 0.65 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45  0.4 
Bulgaria  0  0.25 0.81 0.85 0.77 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.58  0.6  0.59 
Croatia  0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.61 0.61 0.95 0.94 0.98  0.78 
Czech Rep.  0  0  0.56  0.74 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91  0.69 
Estonia  0  0  1  1  1  0.86 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84  0.91 
Georgia  0  0  0  0.67 0.67 0.77  0.8  0.84 0.91 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.66 
Hungary  0.91 0.92 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94  0.84 
Kazakhstan 0  0  0.97  0.99 0.99 0.99  1  1  1  1 0.67  0.67 1  0.94 
Kyrgyzstan  0  0.05 0.53 0.67 0.73 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  0.74 
Latvia  0  0  0  0.9  0.9  0.85 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88  0.67 
Lithuania  0  0  0  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93  0.56 
Macedonia 0.6  0.7  0.74  0.78 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.56 0.89 0.89 0.94 0.95  0.8 
Moldova  0.27 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.23  0.17 
Poland  0.57 0.81 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.66  1  0.63 
Romania  0  0.11 0.18 0.28 0.44  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.98 0.64 0.63 0.62  0.46 
Russia  0  0  0  0.27 0.27  0.3  0.33 0.33 0.83 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93  0.47 
Slovakia  0  0  0.2  0.33 0.48 0.48 0.82 0.82 0.49 0.52 0.85 0.87 0.87  0.52 
Slovenia  0.67 0.67 0.33 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.57 0.57  0.6  0.6  0.53 
Tajikistan  0  0  0.5  0.87 0.93 0.93 0.97  1  1  1  0.67 0.67 0.67  0.71 
Turkmenistan  0.63  0.4  0.4  0.66 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.74  0.5  0.56 0.56 0.58 0.58  0.6 
Ukraine  0  0  0  0.27 0.27  0.6  0.87 0.87 0.43 0.93  1  1  1  0.56 
Uzbekistan  0  0  1  1  0.83 0.33 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47  0.65 40   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
 
Table A2: Index of Internal Liberalization, Averaged. Input-only versus Indexes 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes (Lora Transformation). Whole Period versus Late 
Transition 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes  Input-only  Country 
1989-2001 1997-2001  1989-2001 1997-2001 
 
Albania 0.44  0.92  0.44  0.92 
Armenia 0.70  0.94  0.69  0.95 
Azerbaijan 0.69  0.78  0.58  0.70 
Belarus 0.40  0.44  0.39  0.30 
Bulgaria 0.59  0.59  0.57  0.47 
Croatia 0.78  0.82  0.74  0.74 
Czech Rep.  0.69 0.91  0.66 0.93 
Estonia 0.91  0.85  0.94  0.90 
Georgia 0.66  0.97  0.65  0.98 
Hungary 0.84  0.94  0.85  1.00 
Kazakhstan 0.94  0.87 0.92  0.80 
Kyrgyzstan 0.74  0.97  0.75  0.97 
Latvia 0.67  0.88  0.69  0.93 
Lithuania 0.56  0.93  0.56  0.93 
Macedonia 0.80  0.85 0.80  0.85 
Moldavia 0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
Poland 0.63  0.70  0.49  0.58 
Romania 0.46  0.69  0.33  0.59 
Russia 0.47  0.91  0.47  0.91 
Slovakia 0.52  0.72  0.48  0.67 
Slovenia 0.53  0.57  0.42  0.43 
Tajikistan 0.71  0.80  0.61  0.70 
Turkmenistan 0.60  0.55  0.42  0.37 
Ukraine 0.56  0.87  0.56  0.87 
Uzbekistan 0.65  0.47  0.65  0.47         Reform Redux: 






Table A3: Input-only Index of External Liberalization for 25 Transition Economies (Lora Transformation) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Average 
Albania  0  0  0  0 0.4  0.38 0.5  0.588  0.526  0.526 0.5  0.526  0.75  0.36 
Armenia  0  0  0  0 0.5  0.35  0.412  0.611 0.7  0.81 0.8 0.8  0.75  0.44 
Azerbaijan  0  0  0  0  0.31  0.33  0.316  0.421 0.5 0.5 0.5  0.412 0.5  0.29 
Belarus  0  0  0  0  0.24  0.19 0.313  0.25 0.143 0.095 0.095 0.095  0  0.11 
Bulgaria  0  0  0  0.33  0.5  0.47 0.471  0.5 0.476 0.571 0.571  0.7  1  0.43 
Croatia  0  0  0  0  0.39  0.44  0.5 0.556 0.667 0.619 0.667 0.667  1  0.42 
Czech  Rep.  0  0 0.25 0.25  0.5 0.5  0.688 0.778 0.762 0.81 0.75 0.75 1 0.54 
Estonia  0  0  0  0.33  0.19  0.56 0.688 0.833 0.857 0.857 0.952 0.895  1  0.55 
Georgia  0  0  0  0.33  0.47  0.47 0.471 0.706 0.762 0.714 0.762 0.632  1  0.49 
Hungary  0  0 0.25 0.25 0.56 0.53  0.588  0.765  0.619  0.571  0.667  0.6  1  0.49 
Kazakhstan  0 0 0 0  0.33  0.32 0.368 0.579 0.571 0.571 0.476  0.45 0.75  0.34 
Kyrgyzstan  0  0  0  0  0.8 0.81  0.938  0.875 0.85  0.857 0.81  0.842  1  0.60 
Latvia  0  0 0.33 0.33 0.77 0.84  0.842 0.85  0.857  0.857 0.95  0.947  1  0.66 
Lithuania  0  0  0  0  0.56  0.63 0.611 0.632 0.684 0.667 0.667  0.7  1  0.47 
Macedonia  0 0 0 0 0  0.28 0.278 0.278 0.476 0.524 0.571  0.55 0.75  0.28 
Moldova  0  0  0  0  0.38  0.28 0.389 0.389 0.381 0.381 0.429 0.421  1  0.31 
Poland  0  0 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.33  0.474  0.526  0.571  0.571 0.55 0.55  1  0.42 
Romania  0  0  0  0 0.44 0.38  0.438  0.438  0.5 0.55  0.524  0.526  1  0.37 
Russia  0  0  0  0 0.25 0.25  0.235  0.368  0.4 0.35  0.3  0.263 0.75  0.24 
Slovakia  0  0  0.25  0.25  0.38  0.47 0.588 0.556 0.524 0.571 0.619 0.579  1  0.44 
Slovenia  0  0  0.33  0.33  0.47  0.47 0.588  0.6 0.476 0.476 0.524 0.667  1  0.46 
Tajikistan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.5  0.5 0.15 
Turkmenistan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0.5  0.25  0.25 0.08 
Ukraine  0  0  0  0 0.06 0.11  0.222  0.222  0.4  0.3 0.35 0.25 0.75  0.21 
Uzbekistan  0  0  0  0  0.2  0.19 0.176 0.316 0.238 0.238 0.238  0.1  0  0.13 42   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 




Table A4: Index of External Liberalization, Averaged. Input-only versus Indexes 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes (Lora Transformation). Whole Period versus Late 
Transition 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes  Input-only  Country 
1989-2001 1997-2001  1989-2001  1997-2001 
 
Albania 0.34  0.49  0.36  0.57 
Armenia 0.41  0.65  0.44  0.77 
Azerbaijan 0.31  0.45  0.29  0.48 
Belarus 0.21  0.18  0.11  0.09 
Bulgaria 0.50  0.57  0.43  0.66 
Croatia 0.47  0.63  0.42  0.72 
Czech Rep.  0.50 0.70  0.54  0.81 
Estonia 0.54  0.79  0.55  0.91 
Georgia 0.46  0.66  0.49  0.77 
Hungary 0.54  0.60  0.49  0.69 
Kazakhstan 0.35  0.53 0.34  0.56 
Kyrgyzstan 0.54  0.74  0.60  0.87 
Latvia 0.59  0.76  0.66  0.92 
Lithuania 0.44  0.64  0.47  0.74 
Macedonia 0.32  0.51 0.28  0.57 
Moldavia 0.34  0.51  0.31  0.52 
Poland 0.39  0.55  0.42  0.65 
Romania 0.42  0.53  0.37  0.62 
Russia 0.28  0.41  0.24  0.41 
Slovakia 0.43  0.59  0.44  0.66 
Slovenia 0.46  0.57  0.46  0.63 
Tajikistan 0.22  0.45  0.15  0.35 
Turkmenistan 0.15  0.26  0.08  0.20 
Ukraine 0.22  0.38  0.21  0.41 
Uzbekistan 0.15  0.20  0.13  0.16         Reform Redux: 






Table A5: Input-only Index of Privatization for 25 Transition Economies (Lora Transformation)  
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 2001 Average 
Albania    0.21 0.62 0.66 0.47 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.43  0.52 0.55  0.46 
Armenia      0.09 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.66  0.70 0.73  0.43 
Azerbaijan  0.29    0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.34 0.35  0.31 0.31  0.24 
Belarus    0.00 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.17  0.19 0.28  0.12 
Bulgaria  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.47 0.55  0.68 0.72  0.31 
Croatia    0.01 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.45 0.45  0.61 0.66  0.33 
Czech Rep.    0.02  0.13  0.38 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.56  0.63 0.74  0.43 
Estonia    0.16 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.49 0.51  0.60 0.62  0.39 
Georgia  0.02 0.08 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.68  0.69 0.71  0.40 
Hungary  0.19 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.36 0.64 0.78 0.89 0.87 0.90  0.94 0.90  0.58 
Kazakhstan   0.41  0.36  0.13 0.18 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.59 0.64  0.69 0.68  0.44 
Kyrgyzstan  0.00 0.01 0.15 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.41 0.49 0.53 0.49  0.53 0.53  0.32 
Latvia          0.27 0.29 0.33 0.50 0.60 0.62  0.64 0.67  0.49 
Lithuania      0.06 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.50 0.49  0.55 0.58  0.33 
Macedonia     0.35  0.52 0.37 0.22 0.35 0.35 0.63 0.61  0.72 0.76  0.49 
Moldova      0.14 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.41 0.49 0.55  0.62 0.62  0.34 
Poland  0.63 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.48 0.59  0.67 0.69  0.41 
Romania    0.01 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.49  0.54 0.57  0.28 
Russia      0.02 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.41 0.40 0.35  0.07 0.08  0.20 
Slovakia    0.62 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.62 0.62 0.63  0.64 0.80  0.53 
Slovenia    0.01 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.28  0.30 0.27  0.21 
Tajikistan    0.00 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.28 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.53  0.51 0.52  0.30 
Turkmenistan        0.00 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.18  0.13 0.13  0.14 
Ukraine      0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.34 0.36  0.37 0.39  0.18 






Table A6: Index of Privatization, Averaged. Input-only versus Indexes 
Combining Inputs and Outcomes (LoraTtransformation). Whole Period 
versus Late Transition  
Combining Inputs and 
Outcomes 
 Input-only  Country 
1989-2001 1997-2001  1989-2001  1997-2001 
 
Armenia 0.33  0.47  0.43  0.61 
Azerbaijan 0.22  0.33  0.24  0.31 
Belarus 0.12  0.19  0.12  0.19 
Bulgaria 0.33  0.54  0.31  0.56 
Croatia 0.35  0.52  0.33  0.49 
Czech Rep.  0.46 0.66 0.43 0.59 
Estonia 0.41  0.57  0.39  0.52 
Georgia 0.36  0.59  0.40  0.65 
Hungary 0.58  0.84  0.58  0.90 
Kazakhstan 0.37  0.55 0.44 0.61 
Kyrgyzstan 0.31  0.47  0.32  0.52 
Latvia 0.38  0.58  0.49  0.61 
Lithuania 0.32  0.50  0.33  0.48 
Macedonia 0.41  0.54 0.49 0.61 
Moldova 0.29  0.48  0.34  0.54 
Poland 0.42  0.56  0.41  0.56 
Romania 0.32  0.46  0.28  0.45 
Russia 0.26  0.39  0.20  0.26 
Slovakia 0.52  0.73  0.53  0.66 
Slovenia 0.33  0.46  0.21  0.27 
Tajikistan 0.26  0.43  0.30  0.49 
Turkmenistan 0.12  0.16  0.14  0.17 
Ukraine 0.20  0.36  0.18  0.34 
Uzbekistan 0.22  0.30  0.19  0.21         Reform Redux: 






Table B1: The Determinants of Internal Liberalization. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.002)  (-0.004)  (0.002)+  (0.002)+  (0.002)** (-0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)+ (0.002)+ 
Unemployment  0.009 0.002 0.01  0.011 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.011 
 (0.005)+  (-0.006)  (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.005)** (0.005)+  (-0.005)  (0.005)** (0.005)** 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.04  0.0001  -0.041  -0.037  -0.038  -0.016  -0.024 -0.04 -0.039 
 (0.013)*  (-0.017)  (0.013)*  (0.013)*  (0.013)* (-0.014) (-0.015) (0.013)* (0.012)* 
Log  of  inflation -0.006          
  (-0.011)          
Financial crisis indicator  0.047               
    (-0.403)         
Fiscal  deficit     0.001        
     (-0.003)        
EU  negotiations      0.044       
      (-0.03)       
Electoral calendar        0.012      
       (-0.011)      
Leadership changes           0.107       
         (0.026)*     
Political alternation             0.079     
         (0.030)*    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           (0.001) 
Constant  0.789 0.707 0.771 0.732 0.713 0.511 0.613 0.734 0.731 
 (0.098)*  (0.099)*  (0.087)*  (0.079)*  (0.078)* (0.098)* (0.093)* (0.092)* (0.077)* 
Observations  256 169 255 262 257 262 262 262 262 
No. of countries  25  21  25  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 46   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 




Table B2: The Determinants of External Liberalization. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.007 0.011 0.011  0.01  0.01  0.009  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Unemployment  0.01  0.003 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.011  0.01  0.014 0.013 
  (0.003)*  -0.003  (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)** (0.004)* (0.004)* 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.061 -0.067 -0.055  -0.05 -0.057 -0.028 -0.034 -0.061 -0.06 
  (0.009)* (0.013)* (0.010)* (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.010)* (0.010)* (0.009)* (0.009)* 
Log  of  inflation -0.031          
  ( 0 . 0 0 7 ) *           
Financial  crisis  indicator  -0.076         
    - 0 . 5 5 8          
Fiscal  deficit     -0.001        
     - 0 . 0 0 2         
EU  negotiations      0.153       
      ( 0 . 0 3 5 ) *        
Electoral calendar        0.012      
       (0.007)+      
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       0.134     
        ( 0 . 0 1 8 ) *      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.119    
         ( 0 . 0 2 4 ) *     
Distance  between  capital  cities        0.0001   
          ( 0 . 0 0 1 )    
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           ( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
Constant  0.722 0.726  0.56  0.532 0.531 0.282 0.374  0.54  0.6 
  (0.068)* (0.071)* (0.063)* (0.060)* (0.068)* (0.071)* (0.070)* (0.073)* (0.070)* 
Observations  258 169 257 264 259 264 264 264 264 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%         Reform Redux: 







Table B3: The Determinants of Privatization. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.002 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.001)**  (0.003)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* 
Unemployment  0.004 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.008 
  -0.002  (0.003)** (0.002)* (0.002)** (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)+ (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Freedom H. Index  -0.031  -0.045  -0.031  -0.016 -0.034 -0.004 -0.005 -0.032 -0.032 
 (0.008)*  (0.011)*  (0.008)*  (0.008)**  (0.008)* -0.009  -0.009 (0.008)*  (0.008)* 
Log  of  inflation -0.044          
  (0.005)*          
Financial crisis indicator  0.859               
    (0.363)**         
Fiscal  deficit     0.001        
     -0.002            
EU  negotiations      0.228       
      (0.028)*       
Electoral calendar        0.009      
       -0.006      
Leadership changes (cum.)          0.119       
        (0.016)*     
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.126    
         (0.020)*    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           (0.001) 
Constant  0.604 0.483  0.422 0.34 0.404 0.13 0.195  0.464  0.399 
 (0.048)*  (0.057)*  (0.047)*  (0.049)*  (0.048)* (0.057)** (0.058)* (0.058)* (0.049)* 
Observations  243 168 245 247 242 247 247 247 247 
No. of countries  25  21  25  25  25  25  25  25  25 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
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Table B4: The Determinants of Internal Liberalization Reversals. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.058 0.006 0.045 0.052 0.057  0.05  0.05  0.052 0.052 
  -0.036 -0.049 -0.033  (0.031)+  (0.032)+ -0.032  -0.031 (0.031)+  (0.031)+ 
Unemployment  0.065 0.055 0.053  0.05  0.052 0.051  0.04  0.049  0.05 
  -0.041  -0.048  -0.041  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04  -0.041  -0.04 -0.04 
Freedom H. Index  -0.12  0.032  -0.081  -0.091 -0.071 -0.048 -0.004 -0.092 -0.092 
  -0.117 -0.147 -0.111 -0.121 -0.113 -0.147  -0.14  -0.11  -0.11 
Strikes    0.826 2.042 0.822 0.825 0.823 0.823 0.735 0.825 0.822 
 (0.340)**  (0.694)*  (0.337)**  (0.336)**  (0.341)** (0.336)** (0.350)** (0.335)** (0.338)** 
Log  of  inflation  0.1          
  - 0 . 1 3 8           
Financial  crisis  indicator  51.428         
    -38.022         
Fiscal  deficit     0.024        
     - 0 . 0 4 6         
EU  negotiations      0.004       
      -0.549       
Electoral calendar         0.015        
       -0.143      
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       0.124     
        - 0 . 2 8      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.275    
         -0.264    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.0001 
           - 0 . 0 0 2  
Constant -2.462  -2.508  -2  -2.054  -2.143 -2.422 -2.629 -2.039 -2.033 
  (0.806)* (0.796)* (0.660)* (0.697)* (0.692)* (1.062)** (0.872)* (0.965)** (0.751)* 
Observations  228 161 231 232 227 232 232 232 232 
No.  of  countries  24 20 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
         Reform Redux: 







Table B5: The Determinants of External Liberalization Reversals. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.052 0.042 0.032  0.03  0.031 0.033 0.029 0.033 0.027 
 (0.029)+  -0.038  -0.025  -0.025  -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 
Unemployment  0.02  0.001 0.005 0.007 0.004  0  0.015 0.004 0.009 
  -0.029 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.027 
Freedom H. Index  0.014  -0.026  0.023  0  0.005  -0.073  -0.067  0.012  0.011 
 -0.09  -0.113  -0.087  -0.095  -0.088 -0.125 -0.112 -0.086 -0.086 
OECD  growth  1.367 0.927 1.314 1.296 1.29 1.347 1.329 1.268 1.321 
 (0.331)*  (0.374)**  (0.331)*  (0.331)*  (0.329)* (0.336)* (0.331)* (0.326)* (0.334)* 
Log  of  inflation 0.155          
  -0.115          
Financial  crisis  indicator  -8.547         
    -8.027         
Fiscal  deficit     -0.024        
     -0.035        
EU  negotiations      -0.148       
      -0.551       
Electoral calendar         0.025        
       -0.104      
Leadership changes (cum.)          -0.233       
           -0.254      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        -0.276    
         -0.258    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           -0.006 
           ( 0 . 0 0 3 ) * *  
Constant -5.84  -3.737  -5.186  -4.951  -4.988 -4.438 -4.557 -4.353  -4.4 
 (1.250)*  (1.251)*  (1.151)*  (1.098)*  (1.126)* (1.228)* (1.157)* (1.304)* (1.139)* 
Observations  237 151 236 243 241 243 243 243 243 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 








Table B6: The Determinants of Privatization Reversals. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP growth  -0.02  -0.045  -0.015  -0.012  -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.003 -0.008 
 -0.033  -0.051  -0.03  -0.029  -0.029  -0.03  -0.029  -0.03  -0.029 
Unemployment  0.005 0.04 0.028  0.029  0.029  0.021  0.035 0.02 0.024 
  -0.036 -0.041 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.025 -0.099 -0.025 -0.028 -0.033 -0.115 -0.09  -0.016 -0.026 
 -0.123  -0.208  -0.12  -0.125  -0.126 -0.159 -0.153 -0.122 -0.121 
FDI -0.24  -0.42  -0.228  -0.23  -0.229  -0.198  -0.219  -0.228  -0.228 
  (0.127)+ (0.195)** (0.116)** (0.119)+ (0.117)** (0.119)+ (0.117)+ (0.116)** (0.116)+ 
Log  of  inflation  -0.092          
  -0.16          
Financial crisis 
indicator    40.373         
    -34.376         
Fiscal  deficit     0.015        
     -0.038        
EU  negotiations      0.026       
       -0.868          
Electoral calendar        0.014      
       -0.133      
Leadership changes (cum.)          -0.288       
        -0.345     
Political  alternation  (cum.)        -0.223    
         -0.353    
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           0.005 
           - 0 . 0 0 5  
Constant -0.651  -0.693  -1.13  -1.198  -1.208 -0.479 -0.797 0.315  -1.694 
 -1.005  -0.96  -0.724  (0.720)+  (0.717)+ -1.1  -0.932 -1.153  (0.852)** 
Observations  172 126 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
         Reform Redux: 







Table B7: The Determinants of the Persistence of Internal Liberalization Reversals. Random-effects Panel 
Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.058 -0.006 0.039 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.042 
 (0.032)+  -0.043  -0.03  -0.029  -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.029 -0.029 
Unemployment  0.056 0.043 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.044 0.027 0.045 0.048 
  -0.035 -0.041 -0.038 -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 -0.038 -0.039 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.172 0.004  -0.14  -0.15  -0.131 -0.074 -0.024 -0.147 -0.146 
 (0.103)+  -0.133  -0.108  -0.112  -0.109 -0.136 -0.122 -0.107 -0.107 
Strikes  0.896 1.39 0.824  0.804  0.813 0.81 0.768  0.811  0.788 
  (0.179)* (0.242)* (0.259)* (0.250)* (0.254)* (0.242)* (0.198)* (0.247)* (0.252)* 
Log  of  inflation 0.156          
  - 0 . 1 0 9           
Financial  crisis  indicator  16.879         
    -12.974         
Fiscal  deficit     0.012        
     - 0 . 0 4 5         
EU  negotiations      -0.071       
      - 0 . 4 6 4        
Electoral calendar         0.027        
       -0.128      
Leadership changes (cum.)          0.203       
        -0.237     
Political  alternation  (cum.)        0.383    
         (0.213)+    
Distance  between  capital  cities        0.0001   
          ( 0 . 0 0 1 )    
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           -0.001 
           - 0 . 0 0 2  
Constant -1.401  -0.693  -0.665  -0.624 -0.736 -1.192 -1.464 -0.973  -0.49 
  -0.862 -1.141 -0.921 -0.938 -0.955 -1.152 -0.916  -1.09  -0.992 
Observations  228 161 231 232 227 232 232 232 232 
No.  of  countries  24 20 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 52   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 





Table B8: The Determinants of the Persistence of External Liberalization Reversals. Random-effects Panel 
Estimates 
GDP  growth  0.072 0.069 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.054  0.05 
  (0.024)* (0.033)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.027)** (0.022)** 
Unemployment 0.012  -0.003  0  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  0.006  0.087  0.002 
  -0.021 -0.025 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021  (0.051)+  -0.021 
Freedom H. Index  0.051  0.032  0.063  0.055  0.05  0.015  0  -0.094  0.057 
  -0.066 -0.092 -0.067 -0.075 -0.067 -0.096 -0.085 -0.204 -0.067 
OECD  growth  0.888 0.534 0.817 0.816 0.819 0.847 0.848 0.688 0.831 
  (0.250)* (0.283)+ (0.249)* (0.253)* (0.251)* (0.255)* (0.252)*  (0.268)**  (0.251)* 
Log  of  inflation  0.155          
  (0.084)+          
Financial  crisis  indicator    -7.438         
    - 6 . 4 3 3          
Fiscal  deficit     -0.002        
     - 0 . 0 3         
EU  negotiations      0.002       
      -0.422       
Electoral calendar        0.006      
       -0.081      
Leadership  changes  (cum.)       -0.113     
        - 0 . 2      
Political  alternation  (cum.)        -0.202    
         -0.201    
Distance  between  capital  cities         0.0001   
          (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU           -0.004 
           ( 0 . 0 0 2 ) +  
Constant  4.858  12.532  9.736  10.497  5.239 9.444 2.861 4.843  10.616 
  -48.102 -667.583 -510.242 -474.889  -66.19  -561.459  -20.573  -195.138 -442.249 
Observations  237 151 236 243 241 243 243 231 243 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25 25 25 25 25 23 25 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%         Reform Redux: 














Table B9: The Determinants of the Persistence of Privatization Reversals. Random-effects Panel Estimates 
GDP  growth  -0.011 -0.018 -0.006  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002  -0.004  0.002  0.001 
  (-0.028) (-0.042) (-0.025)  (-0.025)  (-0.025)  (-0.025) (-0.025) (-0.026)  (-0.025) 
Unemployment  0.005 0.033 0.022  0.023  0.022  0.017 0.03  0.017  0.019 
  (-0.032) (-0.035) (-0.026)  (-0.026)  (-0.027)  (-0.026) (-0.027) (-0.026)  (-0.027) 
Freedom  H.  Index  -0.012 -0.051 -0.017  -0.02 -0.015 -0.09  -0.089  -0.011  -0.017 
  (-0.108) (-0.175) (-0.104)  (-0.107)  (-0.109)  (-0.133) (-0.13)  (-0.104)  (-0.105) 
FDI  -0.256 -0.406 -0.238  -0.238  -0.239 -0.209  -0.226  -0.232 -0.238 
  (0.118)** (0.171)** (0.109)**  (0.111)**  (0.109)** (0.111)+  (0.108)**  (0.112)** (0.109)** 
Log  of  inflation  -0.089              
  (-0.136)              
Financial crisis indicator  32.118               
   (-28.317)              
Fiscal  deficit     0.013           
     (-0.033)           
EU  negotiations      -0.044         
      (-0.784)         
Electoral  calendar        -0.014       
        (-0.112)       
Leadership changes (cum.)          -0.249       
          (-0.293)      
Political alternation (cum.)            -0.265     
            (-0.311)     
Distance between capital cities              0.0001   
             (0.001)   
FSU  vs.  non-FSU              0.004 
              ( - 0 . 0 0 4 )  
Constant  11.788 14.803 11.931  11.784  11.755  12.693 12.821  3.52 13.55 
 -737.865  (1,153.991)  -769.76  -657.948  -762.545  -714.062  (1,024.420)  -6.657  -496.707 
Observations  172 126 175  175  175  175 175 175  175 
No.  of  countries  25 21 25  25  25  25 25 25  25 





Description of Variables Underlying the Reform Indexes 
 
Internal Liberalization 
As concerns internal liberalization, the following data were collected (in alphabetical order):  
 
1. Number of goods subject to price regulation – EBRD basket 
Source: EBRD 
Coding: Gives the number of goods which are subject to price regulation based on the EBRD 
basket. The EBRD basket contains 15 goods. It is indicated if the price of a particular good is 
regulated in a given year (any regulation = 1, no regulation = 0). These goods are: flour/bread, meat, 
milk, gasoline/petrol, cotton textiles, shoes, paper, cars, TV sets, cement, steel, coal, wood, rent and 
intercity bus services.  
 
2. Share of administered prices in CPI 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various years 
Coding: Gives the weight of administered (regulated) prices in the consumer price index (CPI).  
  
3. Wage regulation 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various years 




As concerns external liberalization, the following data were collected (in alphabetical order):  
 
1. Compatibility with Article VIII 
Source: IMF web site  
Coding: Date from which the country is compatible with Article VIII (current account 
convertibility). We assign 0 for compatible, 1 otherwise. 
 
2. Controls on commercial credit 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No controls = 0, any controls = 1 
 
3. Controls on foreign direct investment 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No controls = 0, any controls = 1 
 
4. Controls on the liquidation of foreign direct investment  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No controls = 0, any controls = 1 
 
5. Documentation requirements for release of foreign exchange for imports 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No requirement = 0, any requirements = 1 
 
6. Exchange taxes 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database    Reform Redux: 




Coding: No taxes = 0, any taxes = 1 
 
7. Export duties as a percentage of tax revenue 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Coding: Gives the ratio of export duties to tax revenues in percentages 
 
8. Export licences 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No licences = 0, any licences = 1  
 
9. Export taxes 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No taxes = 0, any taxes = 1 
 
10. Import duties as a percentage of tax revenue 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Coding: Gives the ratio of import duties to tax revenues in percentages 
 
11. Import licences and quotas 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No licences and quotas = 0, any licences and quotas = 1 
 
12. Import tariff rate 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 
Coding: Gives the weighted average of import tariff rates on non-agricultural and non-fuel products 
(i.e. manufactured products, ores and metals); the duty type is effectively the applied rate (AHS); 
also differentiates the rates according to region; distinguishes the rates applied to the world, 
developed countries, developing countries, Eastern Europe and least developed countries. We use 
the rates applied to the world in the empirical estimations. 
 
13. Interest rate liberalization 
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various years 
Coding: Distinguishes between limited de jure, limited de facto and full liberalization. For 
computation purposes, full = 0, 1 otherwise.  
 
14. Investment transactions 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
Coding: No regulation = 0, any regulation = 1 
 
15. Multiple exchange rates 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
Coding: Yes – for multiple exchange rates and de facto multiple exchange rates, no for single rate. 
We assign 1 for multiple rates, 0 otherwise 
 
16. OECD membership 
Source: OECD web site 
Coding: gives the date when the country became an OECD member. We assign 0 for being a 
member, 1 otherwise.  
 
17. a) Openness of the country – 1 56   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
Source: Penn World Tables, Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table 
Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), 
October 2002.  
Coding: Gives the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP for the individual country, all in 
constant USD. 
 
17. b) Openness of the country – 2 
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Coding: Gives the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP for the individual country, all in 
constant USD.  
 
18. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held abroad by residents  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: Fully permitted = 0, any restriction = 1 
 
19. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held domestically by residents 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: Fully permitted = 0, any restriction = 1 
 
20. Permission of foreign exchange accounts for non-residents  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: Fully permitted = 0, any restriction = 1 
 
21. Repatriation requirements 
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database  
Coding: No requirements = 0, any requirements = 1 
 
22. Repatriation requirements for invisible transactions  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database  
Coding: No requirements = 0, any requirements = 1 
 
23. Share of trade with non-transition countries  
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various years 
Coding: Gives the proportion of trade (merchandise exports + imports) to GDP that goes out of 27 
transition countries 
 
24. Surrender requirements  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No requirements = 0, any requirements = 1 
 
25. Surrender requirements for invisible transactions  
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, adapted from 
ELITE database 
Coding: No requirements = 0, any requirements = 1 
 
26. Tariff code lines  
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics    Reform Redux: 




Coding: Gives the ratio of the number of duty-free lines to the number of all tariff lines (number of 
duty-free lines and all tariff lines available also separately). However, most data are not available 
and we do not use this variable. 
 
27. Tariff revenues as a percentage of imports 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various years 
Coding: It seems that for some of the countries, there was analytical break in the data. For instance, 
the Albanian authorities revised the data for the period 1995–2002 in 2003. Only old estimates are 
thus available for the prior period. In this case, only reliable data are used (we do not use the data 
for Albania in 1992–1994, Azerbaijan in 1991–1994 and Bulgaria in 1991–1994). 
 
28. Taxes on international trade (per cent of current revenue)  
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Coding: Gives the ratio of taxes on international trade as percentage of current revenue 
 
29. WTO membership  
Source: WTO web site 
Coding: Gives the date when the country became a WTO member. Also indicates whether a non-
member country has the status of observer. Otherwise, the country is assigned “no membership”. 
For the empirical estimation, we assign 0 for being a member, 1 otherwise.  
  
Privatization 
Regarding privatization, the following variables were collected (the coding of these variables is 
obvious from their names): 
 
1. Asset share of private banks in total bank assets  
Source: EBRD survey of central banks 
 
2. Credit to private sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Some missing values (for the interval 1991–1996) 
have been filled in using the WB’s ECSPF database. Where conflicting data values appeared, the 
most recent data (EBRD Transition Report) were used. 
 
3. Number of large enterprises privatized (cumulative) (normalized by real GDP in $) 
Source: WB’s ECSPF data 
 
4. Number of small and medium-sized enterprises privatized (cumulative) 
Source: WB’s ECSPF; source for Albania: Iraj Hashi and Lindita Xhillari: Privatisation and 
Transition in Albania, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1999. For Azerbaijan, the 
statistical office is used.  
 
5. Private sector investment as a percentage of GDP 
Source: WB’s ECSPF data 
 
6. Private sector share in employment  
Source: EBRD staff estimates. Prior to 1994, the source is IMF staff estimates. Where the EBRD 
data conflicts with national sources, priority is given to national sources: Albania: Albanian Institute 
of Statistics, Annual Report 2003; Georgia: Georgian Institute of Statistics; 
Azerbaijan: State Statistical Committee  
 
7. Private sector share in GDP 
Source: EBRD staff estimates. Prior to 1994, the source is IMF staff estimates.  
 
8. Privatization revenues (as a percentage of GDP) 58   Nauro F. Campos and Roman Horváth 
 
   
Source: National authorities and IMF country reports 
 
9. Share of foreign banks in total number of banks 
Source: EBRD survey of central banks 
 
10. Share of small firms privatized (in total small firms available for privatization)  
Source: EBRD survey of national authorities and EBRD staff assessments 
 
11. Total number of enterprises privatized (cumulative) (normalized by real GDP in $) 
Source: WB’s ECSPF data 
 
12. Total number of private enterprises (normalized by real GDP in $) 
Source: WB’s ECSPF data. National sources (statistical institutes) have been used to fill in the 




 CNB WORKING PAPER SERIES 
6/2009  Nauro F. Campos 
Roman Horváth 
Reform redux: Measurement, determinants and reversals 
5/2009 Kamil  Galuščák  





The determination of wages of newly hired employees: Survey 
evidence on internal versus external factors 
4/2009  Jan Babecký  





Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: Survey evidence from 
European firms 
3/2009 Jiri  Podpiera 
Laurent Weill 
Measuring excessive risk-taking in banking 




Implementing the new structural model of the Czech National Bank
 
1/2009 Kamil  Dybczak 
Jan Babecký 
The impact of population ageing on the Czech economy 
14/2008  Gabriel Fagan  
Vitor Gaspar 
Macroeconomic adjustment to monetary union 
13/2008  Giuseppe Bertola  
Anna Lo Prete  
Openness, financial markets, and policies: Cross-country and 
dynamic patterns 
12/2008 Jan  Babecký 
Kamil Dybczak  
Kamil Galuščák 
Survey on wage and price formation of Czech firms 
11/2008 Dana  Hájková  The measurement of capital services in the Czech Republic 
10/2008 Michal  Franta  Time aggregation bias in discrete time models of aggregate 
duration data  
9/2008 Petr  Jakubík 
Christian Schmieder 
Stress testing credit risk: Is the Czech Republic different from 
Germany? 
8/2008 Sofia  Bauducco 
Aleš Bulíř 
Martin Čihák 
Monetary policy rules with financial instability 
 
7/2008 Jan  Brůha 
Jiří Podpiera 
The origins of global imbalances 
6/2008 Jiří Podpiera 
Marie Raková 
The price effects of an emerging retail market  
 
5/2008 Kamil  Dybczak 
David Voňka 
Nico van der Windt 
The effect of oil price shocks on the Czech economy 
 
4/2008  Magdalena M. Borys 
Roman Horváth 
The effects of monetary policy in the Czech Republic: 
An empirical study 
3/2008 Martin  Cincibuch 
Tomáš Holub 
Central bank losses and economic convergence 
 Jaromír Hurník 
2/2008 Jiří Podpiera  Policy rate decisions and unbiased parameter estimation in 





Determinants of house prices in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
17/2007 Pedro  Portugal  U.S. unemployment duration: Has long become bonger or short 
become shorter? 
16/2007  Yuliya Rychalovská   Welfare-based optimal monetary policy in a two-sector small open 
economy 
15/2007 Juraj  Antal 
František Brázdik 
The effects of anticipated future change in the monetary policy 
regime 




Inflation targeting and communication: Should the public read 
inflation reports or tea leaves? 
13/2007 Martin  Cinncibuch 
Martina Horníková 
Measuring the financial markets' perception of EMU enlargement: 
The role of ambiguity aversion 
12/2007 Oxana  Babetskaia-
Kukharchuk 
Transmission of exchange rate shocks into domestic inflation: The 
case of the Czech Republic 
11/2007 Jan  Filáček  Why and how to assess inflation target fulfilment 
10/2007 Michal  Franta 
Branislav Saxa 
Kateřina Šmídková 
Inflation persistence in new EU member states: Is it different than 
in the Euro area members? 
9/2007 Kamil  Galuščák 
Jan Pavel 
Unemployment and inactivity traps in the Czech Republic: 
Incentive effects of policies 
8/2007 Adam  Geršl 
Ieva Rubene  
Tina Zumer 
Foreign direct investment and productivity spillovers:  
Updated evidence from Central and Eastern Europe 
7/2007  Ian Babetskii  
Luboš Komárek  
Zlatuše Komárková 
Financial integration of stock markets among new EU member 
states and the euro area 




Market power and efficiency in the Czech banking sector 
 
5/2007 Jiří Podpiera 
Laurent Weill 
Bad luck or bad management? Emerging banking market 
experience 
4/2007 Roman  Horváth  The time-varying policy neutral rate in real time: A predictor for 
future inflation? 
3/2007 Jan  Brůha 
Jiří Podpiera  
Stanislav Polák 
The convergence of a transition economy:  
The case of the Czech Republic 
 
2/2007  Ian Babetskii  
Nauro F. Campos 
Does reform work? 
An econometric examination of the reform-growth puzzle 
1/2007 Ian  Babetskii 
Fabrizio Coricelli 
Roman Horváth  
Measuring and explaining inflation persistence: 
Disaggregate evidence on the Czech Republic  
 
13/2006  Frederic S. Mishkin  
Klaus Schmidt-
Does inflation targeting make a difference? 
 Hebbel 
12/2006 Richard  Disney 
Sarah Bridges 
John Gathergood  
Housing wealth and household indebtedness: Is there a household 
‘financial accelerator’? 




Measures of potential output from an estimated  
DSGE model of the United States 
10/2006 Jiří Podpiera 
Marie Raková  
 
Degree of competition and export-production relative prices  
when the exchange rate changes: Evidence from a panel of Czech 
exporting companies 
9/2006 Alexis  Derviz 
Jiří Podpiera 
Cross-border lending contagion in multinational banks 
8/2006 Aleš  Bulíř 
Jaromír Hurník 
The Maastricht inflation criterion: “Saints” and “Sinners” 
7/2006 Alena  Bičáková 
Jiří Slačálek 
Michal Slavík 
Fiscal implications of personal tax adjustments in the Czech 
Republic 
6/2006 Martin  Fukač 
Adrian Pagan 
Issues in adopting DSGE models for use in the policy process 
5/2006 Martin  Fukač  New Keynesian model dynamics under heterogeneous expectations 
and adaptive learning 
4/2006 Kamil  Dybczak 
Vladislav Flek 
Dana Hájková  
Jaromír Hurník 
Supply-side performance and structure in the Czech Republic 
(1995–2005) 
3/2006 Aleš  Krejdl  Fiscal sustainability – definition, indicators and assessment of 
Czech public finance sustainability 
2/2006 Kamil  Dybczak  Generational accounts in the Czech Republic 
1/2006 Ian  Babetskii  Aggregate wage flexibility in selected new EU member states 
14/2005  Stephen G. Cecchetti  The brave new world of central banking: The policy challenges 
posed by asset price booms and busts 
13/2005  Robert F. Engle 
Jose Gonzalo Rangel 
The spline GARCH model for unconditional volatility and its 
global macroeconomic causes 
12/2005  Jaromír Beneš  
Tibor Hlédik  
Michael Kumhof 
David Vávra 
An economy in transition and DSGE: What the Czech national 
bank’s new projection model needs 
11/2005 Marek  Hlaváček 
Michael Koňák  
Josef Čada 
The application of structured feedforward neural networks to the 
modelling of daily series of currency in circulation 
10/2005 Ondřej Kameník  Solving SDGE models: A new algorithm for the sylvester equation 
9/2005  Roman Šustek  Plant-level nonconvexities and the monetary transmission 
mechanism 
8/2005 Roman  Horváth  Exchange rate variability, pressures and optimum currency 
area criteria: Implications for the central and eastern european 
countries 
7/2005  Balázs Égert  Foreign exchange interventions and interest rate policy  Luboš Komárek  in the Czech Republic: Hand in glove? 
6/2005 Anca  Podpiera 
Jiří Podpiera 
Deteriorating cost efficiency in commercial banks signals an 
increasing risk of failure  
5/2005  Luboš Komárek 
Martin Melecký 
The behavioural equilibrium exchange rate of the Czech koruna
4/2005  Kateřina Arnoštová 
Jaromír Hurník  
The monetary transmission mechanism in the Czech Republic 
(evidence from VAR analysis) 
3/2005  Vladimír Benáček 
Jiří Podpiera  
Ladislav Prokop 
Determining factors of Czech foreign trade: A cross-section time 
series perspective  
2/2005 Kamil  Galuščák 
Daniel Münich 
Structural and cyclical unemployment: What can we derive 
from the matching function? 
1/2005 Ivan  Babouček 
Martin Jančar 
Effects of macroeconomic shocks to the quality of the aggregate 
loan portfolio 
10/2004 Aleš  Bulíř 
Kateřina Šmídková 
Exchange rates in the new EU accession countries: What have 
we learned from the forerunners 
9/2004 Martin  Cincibuch 
Jiří Podpiera 
Beyond Balassa-Samuelson: Real appreciation in tradables in 
transition countries 
8/2004 Jaromír  Beneš 
David Vávra 
Eigenvalue decomposition of time series with application to the 
Czech business cycle 
7/2004  Vladislav Flek, ed.  Anatomy of the Czech labour market: From over-employment to 
under-employment in ten years? 
6/2004 Narcisa  Kadlčáková 
Joerg Keplinger 
Credit risk and bank lending in the Czech Republic 
5/2004 Petr  Král  Identification and measurement of relationships concerning 
inflow of FDI: The case of the Czech Republic 
4/2004 Jiří Podpiera  Consumers, consumer prices and the Czech business cycle 
identification 
3/2004 Anca  Pruteanu  The role of banks in the Czech monetary policy transmission 
mechanism 
2/2004 Ian  Babetskii  EU enlargement and endogeneity of some OCA criteria: 
Evidence from the CEECs 
1/2004 Alexis  Derviz 
Jiří Podpiera 
Predicting bank CAMELS and S&P ratings: The case of the 
Czech Republic 
 
CNB RESEARCH AND POLICY NOTES 
1/2008 Nicos  Christodoulakis  Ten years of EMU: Convergence, divergence and new policy 
prioritie 
2/2007  Carl E. Walsh   Inflation targeting and the role of real objectives  
1/2007 Vojtěch Benda 
Luboš Růžička 
Short-term forecasting methods based on the LEI approach: The 
case of the Czech Republic 
2/2006 Garry  J.  Schinasi  Private finance and public policy 
1/2006 Ondřej Schneider  The EU budget dispute – A blessing in disguise? 5/2005  Jan Stráský  Optimal forward-looking policy rules in the quarterly projection 
model of the Czech National Bank 
4/2005 Vít  Bárta  Fulfilment of the Maastricht inflation criterion by  
the Czech Republic: Potential costs and policy options 




Eligibility of external credit assessment institutions  
 
2/2005 Martin  Čihák 
Jaroslav Heřmánek 
Stress testing the Czech banking system:  
Where are we? Where are we going? 
1/2005 David  Navrátil 
Viktor Kotlán 
The CNB’s policy decisions – Are they priced in by the markets?
4/2004 Aleš  Bulíř  External and fiscal sustainability of the Czech economy:   
A quick look through the IMF’s night-vision goggles 
3/2004 Martin  Čihák  Designing stress tests for the Czech banking system 
2/2004 Martin  Čihák  Stress testing: A review of key concepts 
1/2004 Tomáš  Holub  Foreign exchange interventions under inflation targeting: 
The Czech experience 
     
CNB ECONOMIC RESEARCH BULLETIN 
November 2009  Financial and global stability issues 
May 2009  Evaluation of the fulfilment of the CNB’s inflation targets 1998–2007 
December 2008  Inflation targeting and DSGE models 
April 2008  Ten years of inflation targeting 
December 2007  Fiscal policy and its sustainability 
August 2007  Financial stability in a transforming economy   
November 2006  ERM II and euro adoption 
August 2006  Research priorities and central banks 
November 2005  Financial stability 
May 2005  Potential output 
October 2004  Fiscal issues 
May 2004  Inflation targeting 




















































Czech National Bank 
Economic Research Department 
Na Příkopě 28, 115 03 Praha 1 
Czech Republic 
phone: +420 2 244 12 321 
fax: +420 2 244 14 278 
http://www.cnb.cz 
e-mail: research@cnb.cz 
ISSN 1803-7070 